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June 14, 1984 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 4 
No. 83-1961 
LANDRETH TIMBER CO. 
v. 
LANDRETH, et al. 
Petitioner to 
nsideration. 
so Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari 
SUMMARY: Petr requests that consideration of its petn for 
cert (filed May 31, 1984) be expedited in order that the case 
may be consolidated with Seagrove Corp v. Vista Resources, Inc., 
No. 83-1084 (cert. granted May 14, 1984) for argument in the 
October Term. 
BACKGROUND: In Seagrove, the CA 2 held that the sale of 
all the stock in a company wa s a securities transaction covered 
by the federal securities laws. The CA 2 recognized but 
rejected the "economic reality" test used by several other 
circuits to find that the sale of a business, including all its 
stock, was not a securities transaction. The Court granted cert 
Petr seeks cert from the CA 9's opinion holding that the 
sale of all the stock in a corporation was part of a sale-of-
business transaction and not covered by the federal securities 
laws. The petn for cert was filed on May 31, 1984. 
CONTENTIONS: Petr contends that the legal issue common to 
both cases is presented in sharply different factual 
situations. Petr alleges that in Seagrove the stock purchasers 
were sophisticated business persons. The investors in Landreth 
allegedly "acquired the shares of a company which was closely 
held, located a continent away from the investors' homes, and 
engaged in a business about which the investors had no 
knowledge." 
Petr suggests that the combination of Seagrove and its petn 
presents the ideal setting for the resolution of an important 
issue of federal law. The different factual settings will 
assist the Court in determining whether there should be a 
sale-of-business or economic reality exception to the federal 
securities laws. However, expedition is necessary as Seagrove 
has been tentatively set for argument early in the October 1984 
Term. 
Resps oppose expedition as well as the petn for cert. 
Resps argue that petr has not expedited its proceedings. The 
CA 9's opinion issued on Mar. 7, 1984 but petr did not file its 
petn until May 31, 1984. Resp's second argument is that the 
cases are not identical. In Seagrove the purchasers assumed 
complete control of management. 
Resps indicate that they will file their opposition to the 
petn on July 2, 1984. But in case the Court does not wait for 
- j -
their response, resps outlined their opposition. Resps contend 
that (a) in Seagrove the corporation was , publicly held whereas 
in Landreth the corporation was a small family owned business; 
(b) the principal purchaser in Landreth, a sophisticated 
investor, conducted his own investigation but the purchasers in 
Seagrove relied on public information available under the 
securities laws; (c) in Landreth the sellers structured the sale 
as the purchasers requested; and (d) in Landreth the purchasers 
assumed immediate and complete control of the business. 
Resps note that they intend to file an amici brief in 
Seagrove noting the differences between the cases. 
DISCUSSION: Petr does present a case in which the CA 9 
took a position contrary to the CA 2's decision in Seagrove. 
The Court, however, was aware of the circuit conflict when it 
granted cert in Seagrove. Furthermore, the Court's grant of 
cert in Seagrove may suggest that the legal issue transcends the 
factual setting of the case. In Seagrove the CA 2 had remanded 
the case for the development of the facts. If the Court thought 
that the factual setting was critical, it might have delayed 
review until the facts were determined. Petr and resps may 
alert the Court to the consequences of its decision in Seagrove 
by filing amici briefs. 
Resps' opposition raises some question as to whether the 
issues raised by petr are certworthy. The Court may want the 
benefit of resps full response before considering the petn. If 
the petn raises only the issues raised in Seagrove, the Court 
may wish to hold the petn for Seagrove. If the petn raises 
other certworthy issues, the Court might postpone the argument 
date in Seagrove in order to allow the cases to be presented in 
tandem. 
CONCLUSION: Although the CA 2 and the CA 9 have taken 
different positions, it is not clear either t hat the courts were 
presented with analogous cases or that this Court needs to take 
cases from both circuits to resolve the legal issue. Host of 
the advantages of consolidation can be accomplished through 
amici briefs and denial of the motion will allow the Court to 
fully study this case before it grants cert. If in October the 
court determines that the cases should be heard together the 
argument date for Seagrove can be postponed. The motion may be 
denied. 
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Cert to CA9 {Browning, Tuttle, 
Farris) 
Federal/Civil Timely 
SUMMARY: that the CA erred in holding tha~h~sale 
corporation is not a transac-
- ~ 
of 100% of the 
tion involving meaning of the federal securi-
ties laws. 
FACTS AND HOLDING BELOW: Resps were the sole shareholders of 
Landreth Timber Co. {Old Landreth), which owned a sawmill in Tonasket, 




Washington. Resps decided to sell the mill. Before a buyer could be 
found, however, a fire destroyed a portion of the mill. Resps then 
set about rebuilding and refurbishing the mill to increase production. 
While construction was underway, a small group of investors represent-
ed by Samuel Dennis expressed an intereit in buying the mill. Resps 
insisted upon a sale of the t ~tock~of Old Landreth rather than a sale 
___.-J 
of its assets. Negotiations for the purchase culminated in an elabo-
rate stock purchase agreement. The purchasers formed a Delaware cor-
poration, the B & D Company, which purchased the stock of Old 
Landreth. B & D and Old Landreth then merged to form petr Landreth 
Timber Co. (New Landreth). Unfortunately, petr New Landreth turned 
out to be unprofitable. It was forced to sell the mill and later went ..__ ____________ -----.,. 
into receivership. 
Shortly therafter, petr brought suit in federal DC, seeking $2.5 
~--~-------------------~ million in damages for violations of the federa~ ~curities laws. 
Petr claimed that resps had materially misrepresented the cost of the 
mill's reconstruction, the condition of the existing machinery, and 
the capacity of the mill when fully operative. The DC granted summary 
judgment for resps, holding that the Old Landreth stock was not a "se-
curity" within the meaning of the federal securities statutes. 
CA9 affirmed, holding that the sale of 100% of the stock of a 
closely held corporation is not a transaction involving a "security." 
In so holding, the CA adopted the "sale of business" doctrine. The 
"sale of business" doctrine teaches that a purchaser of stock who as-
sumes control of a company is not an investor expecting profits from 
the efforts of othersi the stock purchased is therefore not a "securi-
ty" under the securities acts. The CA acknowledged the deep split 
among the CAs on this issue, but aligned itself with the group of Cir-
cuits that favors an inquiry into the economic realities of the under-
lying transaction, rather than an evaluation of the characteristics of 
the instrument involved, in deciding whether the federal securities 
laws apply. Applying the "sale of business" doctrine to the sale of 
the stock in Old Landreth, the CA had no trouble in concluding that 
the underlying transaction was the sale of a lumber business and 
therefore not an investment in a "security." 
CONTENTIONS: Petr is aware that the Court has recently granted 
cert to determine the validity of the "sale of a business" doctrine in 
Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, Inc., No. 83-1084 (cert. granted 
May 14, 1984). Petr asks that this petn be granted as well, because 
it would be unfair to subject it to any rule other than that which 
will be announced in Seagrave. Petr also suggests that the factual 
circumstances of this case might provide the Court with an interesting 
contrast to those presented in Seagrave. The balance of the petn is 
devoted to an attack upon the merits of the "sale of a business" doc-
trine. 
DISCUSSION: Petr is correct in asserting that this petn presents 
precisely the issue raised in Seagrave: whether the purchase of all 
the common stock of a corporation is a transaction in "securities" for 
purposes of the federal securities laws. While I think this is a 
clear hold for Seagrave, I see no reason to grant this case and con-
solidate it with Seagrave for argument. The arguments for and against 
the "sale of business" doctrine seem to be developed adequately in 
Seagrave, and I find nothing so extraordinary about the facts of this 
case that it merits special attention. The Court's disposition of 
I 
Seagrave will take care of this case as well. I therefore recommend 
CFR, with an eye toward a HOLD for Seagrave Corp. v. Vista Resources, 
Inc., No. 83-1084. 
I recommend CFR. 
There is no response. 




Supreme Court of the United States 
Memorandum 
.-
March 7, 1985 
LANDRETH GINA-POW 
MEMO TO: LYNDA 
FROM: LFP, JR. 
RE: 83-1961 Landreth Timber Co. v. Ivan Landreth 
(CA9 - 100%) 
84-165 Gould v. Ruefennache (CA3 - 50%) 
I note that you are the clerk assigned to both of 
these above cases. Your experience at Clary, Gottlieb 
should be helpful in your analysis. 
In Landreth the sale of 100% of the stock of a 
business was involved. In Gould the sale of 50% is at 
issue. ~CI'l.J eld that the anti-fraud provisions of the 
Securities Act applied. I , CA9 - Chief 
Judge Browning writing - reached a different conclusion: 
applying what has come to be known as the "sale of 
business doctrine". It concluded that the Securities Acts 
were not applicable. 
We granted these cases to resolve a wide split of 
authority among seven or eight courts of appeal - the 
split being about evenly divided. The SG has filed amicus 
briefs strongly supporting the view that both of these 
transactions involve the sale of "stock", one of the 
express terms used in the Acts of 33 and 34 to identify 
covered securities, and therefore under the plain language 
of these Acts - as well as their purpose - the anti-fraud 
provisions are applicable. There is no contention that 
the registration provisions apply, as plainly they would 
not as these were private sales involving relatively small 
businesses. 
As I had some familiarity with both of these 
statutes, I confess to a rather strong bias in favor of 
CA9's position that one must look to the substance of the 
transaction, rather than rely solely to the term "stock", 
to conclude that the anti-fraud provision'S of these Acts 
apply. Although the SG struggles to distinguish my 
decison in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, I am not 
yet persuaded. 
To all intense purposes, both of these 
transactions involved - in effect - the transfer of assets 
rather than securities in the normal sense of the term. 
This is more obvious where 100% of the business was bought 
than in the case where an individual purchased only 50% of 
the stock. But both cases involve types of transactions 
that I doubt anyone, at the times these statutes were 
. ' 
enacted, would have believed wj ere covered by any 
provisions of these two federal laws. 
These are fraud cases, and there is no reason to 
believe that the state courts of California and New Jersey 
would not have afforded adqeuate protection to the 
plaintiffs if in fact there had been fraudulent 
representations made that induced the purchase. 
In the present cases the purchasers, in effect, were 
buying into the businesses The purchaser in the New 
Jersey, Gould, case bought 50% of the stock on condition 
that he could participate actively in certain important 
aspects of management. Of course, the purchaser of 100% 
in the CA9 case took over complete control of the 
enterprise. 
Having said all of this, Lynda, I concede that the SG 
makes strong arguments. I have not read any of the 
decisions of the other courts of appeal. Please give me 
your own expert views, summarized briefly as I am 
familiar generally with this area of the law. 
I am, of course, interesteed in whether the rule is 
different depending on extent of the purchase. The 
Landreth case simply is not a "stock" purchase except in 
. ' ' 
the most technical ~ense. Is Gould different because he 
bought only 50%. What if he had bought 25%? 
LFP. JR • 
( ( 
Court ................ . l'oted on......... . ..... , 1~9.vember 9, 1984 
Argued ................ ~., 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ... ' ............. , 19 .. . 









G 0 N POST DIS AFF REV AFf G D 
Burger, Ch. J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a/: 
Brennan, J .................... ~ 
v y; ··· ............... . 
.. • .. • I ~·:.. ·:."_.' 'J..:. .... . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . v Blackmun, J ................. . 
No. 
83-1961 
ABSENT NOT YOTING 
/ 't: . If:;; . 7$.. .. .... . 
Powell, .J ......................................... ·4,~·~ .A.,:...; ......................... . 
Rehnqu1st, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... ~ . . · .-. . . . . . .......................... . 
S~evens, J ................ / . . ......:. ..... ~·~ '.,/ .. f . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . 
0 Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . ....... 'f: · ... ~ V,V.t:~~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......... . 
I 
court ................... . Yorea on .................. , 1::1 ••• 
Argued ................... , 19 .. . Assigned .................. , 19 . . . 
Submitted ................ , 19 .. . Announced ................ , 19 .. . 
LANDRETH TIMBER CO. 
vs. 
LANDRETH, IVAN, K., ET AL. 
HOLD 
FOR 
"' Burger, Ch. J ............. . Brennan, J ................ . 
White, J ..................... . 
Marshall, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . 
Blackmun, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
Powell, J ................... \ . 
Rehnquist, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
G 1/ 0 
. .. l 
... 
Stevens, J .......................... . 
O'Connor, J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... . 
JURISDICTIONAL 
STATEMENT 










~ /.)-~ ~ ~~f-oe~ 
~( ~\~ ~ 
~~ wac - , ~ ··~· ' 
it.' .v--~ ~~.· 11)~<:1) ~ ~~~-
"". .{:; 
~ ~~~~~~ 
' ~.,t-~~ ~ "4_~ 7 ~" :···, 
.'' 1' ~ . ' ~~ ~ ~~~- ~ ', 
.,,: , ~~r~r 
.· ' l··., . , .. dlA-- _e..,c~~ ~1~ .. ':~~ .~ ... ' .. ,·' 
~·· . ·.' : ~' i·l 
:.1 ~ ~~ ·~~;;. - .\ • ·I<· , 
····· .. ... ' 
s~ ' ··v· w~~#l~~ '~. ;.J< 
i'l'~ 'L~<"~'• ~ .. ~ ~ ~· .nu_ /l.-2 £ JL-4~ . - ~ 
a,-112~~~~~~ ~ 
4 ~ ;'/ ~ ... ~  Ck.:ii.? ~~~' ... 't -~ 
~ ~~~ ~~ .,J ~~-- ... r. 
·~ ~~ UK.~ ~ ,La /WL&A-4--~; ,, 
hd.-.a.-1 ~ ~ ~· ~ "', 
~ -h-u.1J.I I{';)<!] ~tj ~N ! ?~ : " 
~~~~~--4.~6_,~ .. 
83-1961 LANDRETH TIMBER v. LANDRETH C~ q 




q IA-~{fvr r~k-~ .~~~) 
~~~~7~ 
~re'. a; ~~ ~ ~ ~ /.2-.t~#P 
~ ~6-f 4-~ ~~~a-
'~': ~ 
17;411 ~,,,. ~~ ~~~ 
~ ~k,d, 4 ~ ~~~~~~ 
~~~~~~ 
~~- ~·  ~ ~a4L1 
/,L~-~r~H4 
( /1 ~ Pj:J. ~ 9~ '-'1-A ~ 
~ ~ .e:.~~ D- L ti ~;4 4f 
.LA • ) j "'l ~If(") 
,.-~~~~~~~ 
~ ~~~~~~~ 
¢. ~ ~ /2-u. ~ . .. ?u> ~~~- w 
~~~~Lc-.6 h ~k_ ~ ~; 






t/19'~ c; ~ ~u.e,-~.~ 
A -• J( ~ -1------- J-~~~ \". 
~ ~ ~ ' \~ 
w~ /1--1--~t-~ ~~-~~1 ;- ~ 
~~~ 7k ¥~~~'~of~~-~ 
LA-~~ 
~~(~.) - ~~~,~~ 
~P(~~~~~t)~ 
~"-~, -'1 ~ ~~~ ~ 
~~.1 cb,p .. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4--








7 .... /r. ~~ ~4 ~· ~~ 
d-~~~/~~?-cd 
~~~~~~.-11/ fQ;L 
~ Tk:..-  ~~~-~~ ~ 
g_~~~k~~~ 
l.\ ~- -
~~~\~f~~ - ----~~~ . 





' . ' ... 
.5'~(~~) 
~ ~~~~ 
f 1 _ '-1 ~ ··~~~~~~ · 
~,,~ ~ ...... ~ 
1• 
~ ,4;, ~t:G ~~ -
~~' A9 ..dC1. ~ ~i;u(J ~~ 
~~~t~~"~r 
 4 ~p $" J .$' ~ti,. JiiiP "* EJ!" A• /.,..{ 
tf ~~~ ~c'?o ~ ~ 
~~~~~~~~ 
~·~~~0 •• ~~- ~,~~  
1-J, ~~ .. ~~ ~4 _..R ,, ~ 
~~. 
~~~~~ 
1-. ~~ ~~jattc::f 
t!Yf~ ~~,.&~,~., ~
<.e.~. ~~ ~/~) d.L~ 
A!:T-~~~~~~ 
~ct~~ . 
..2. 4.-,l~ 91'~ c~ 
3. ~ ~"ii<4 ~~~~? ~ 
h; ~ Lf.J ~~,4...-'-<-~~ 
~ ~4.,_t.~-<~.. ~ ~ 
-1. '.,.J ·7 .... 
~--~ ~ 1,.~.4_, -  
~~t;. 
~~--h-v~~ .. 
No. 83-1961 , -~andreth Timber Co. v. Landreth C fi 'J Conf. 3/29/85 
The Chief Justice lf 
1 o t'J '7 4""' pt a~ ~ -~ 
~ry~~· 





Justice Blackmun ~. 
Justice Powell ~~ 
J~~~~ 
A-1 _h ,~~?.L. 
~~~ 
w~~r-~ ~-e> ~ 
Justice Rehnquist ~ 
Justice Stevens Jl..£,tr 
Justice O'Connor ~ ~ 
landr3 
New footnote 2, to be inserted on p. 5 of 1st Draft 
1Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to 
make clear here that these characteristics are those 
usually associated with common stock, the kind of stock 
ordinarily at issue in cases involving the sale of a 
business. Various types of preferred stock may have 
different characteristics and still be covered by the 
Acts. 
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Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
.iuvrtm.t <!Jcurt of tqt 'Jnittb .ihdt.&' 
Jlulfittgtcu, ~. OJ. 2ltc?J!,~ 
April 25, 1985 
No. 83-1961 Landreth Timber Company v. 
Landreth 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS Of' 
.jtqtrtme <!fourt of tqt ~tb .jtatts 
'IJasJrittgtou. ~. <!f. 2.0,?J!.~ 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL April 25, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1961 - Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE w .. . .J . BRENNAN, .JR. 
.iuprtutt Clfllnri ltf tfrt 'JitttUtb ~ta.tts 
,ruJrin~ ~. QJ. 2ll.;t'l-~ 
April 26, 1985 
No. 83-1961 
Landreth Timber Company 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hpuutt atomt of tltt 'Jlttitt~ .§htttg 
... a:glfht:gbm. ~. ar. 2llp~$ 
April 26, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1961, Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
Re: 
.jupretttt QI!tud ltf Urt ~uittb- ,jhdtg 
Jfag4htghtu. Jl. QI. 2ll.;t~~ 
83-1961 
84-165 
April 26, 1985 
Landreth v. Landreth 
Gould v. Ruefenacht 
Dear Lewis: 
As I stated at Conference, after oral argument I 
concluded that I would follow your lead in these 
cases. I voted with you, and, having read your 
opinions, must acknowledge that they are extremely 
persuasive. I continue to be troubled, however, by a 
rather firm conviction that Congress did not intend 
the statutes to apply to transactions of this kind, 
but rather was intending to deal with transactions in 
publicly traded securities. Perhaps it's far too 
late in the day to confine the statute to its 
original purpose, but I'm sufficiently troubled by 
the cases that I hope you will forgive me if I take a 
few days to reflect before corning to rest. I would 
like to try to write out two or three paragraphs 
summarizing my thoughts, but I have so many balls in 





JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
,ju.prttttt <!faun 11f tqt 'Jifui:ttb ,jtattg 
-a:g!tittghm. ~. Qj:. 2ll~)!.~ 
April 29, 1985 
Re: 83-1961 - Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
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Jlagfringron. !Jl. <!f. 2llbf'!.;l 
THE cHIEF JUSTICE May 6, 1985 
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lfp/ss 05/24/85 
No. 83-1961 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth 
''t.:"8~ 
This ca~ is here on writ of certiorari to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. It presents the 
question whether the sale of all of the stoc~ of a closely held 
company~is a securities transaction subject to the antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws. 
The Court of Appeals applied the "sale of business" 
doctrine. It concluded;ihat in view of the economic realities of 
the transaction,/~ the securities laws did not apply. 
The securities sol~were common stock. They possessed 
J 
all of the customary characteristics of common stock. As such, --
they came expressly within the definition of a securityJ'in both 
the~'f;;;-~~3-~~eurities Pd:s. 
1\ 
We therefore hold that under these circumstances, 
reference to the economic realities of the transaction/ is 
unnecessary to determine/ whether the securities laws apply. ~ 
~~~t~ecision of the Court of Appeals fo.r the L-
~ . ~ 
~nti1 Ci:ceui-t. 
JUSTICE STEVENS has filed a dissenting opinion. 
83-1961 Landreth Timber v. Landreth (Lynda) 
LFP for the Court 4/1/85 
1st draft 4/25/85 
2nd draft 5/2/85 
3rd draft 5/20/85 








1st draft 5/15/85 
2nd draft 5/16/85 
3rd draft 5/20/85 
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1000 Florida Ave., *IJiralown, MD 21741 
5 DAY SE AVICE 
By STEPHEN WEKMIEL 
St.Qff Reporter o/THE WALL 8Tllii:JCT JOURNAL 
WASHINGTON- The Supreme Court 
ruled that federal securities law applies 
to the sale of stock in a closely held bust· 
ness, even when the aim of the transaction 
is the purchase of the business. 
In two decisions, the high court refused 
to recognize an exception to federal securi-
ties law for transactions In which 50% or 
more of a closely held company's stock is 
sold. 
The rulings settled a legal question that 
ha,s sharply divided federal appeals courts 
. throughout the country, as well as securi-
ties-law experts. 
Appeals courts In Chicago, Denver, San 
Francisco and Atlanta have ruled that 
when the purpose of a stock purchase Is 
the acquisition of a closely held company, 
the transaction Is exempt from federal se· 
curities law. Under this "sale-of-business" 
exemption, a buyer or seller couldn't sue 
under the broad anti-fraud provisions of 
federal securities law. 
Federal appeals courts in New York, 
Richmond, Va., Philadelphia, New Orleans 
and St. Louis have said sale-of-business 
transactions aren't exempt from federal 
securities law. 
The Supreme Court yesterday burled 
the sale-of-business doctrine. In 8-1 deci-
sions, both written by Justice Lewis Pow· 
ell, the high court said that as long as the 
securities involved have the traditional 
characteristics of stock-the right to re-
ceive dividends, negotiability, voting rights 
and the ability to appreciate In value-fed-
eral securities law applies, regardless of 
the purpose of the transaction. • 
The high court rejected the suggestion 
that securities law ·should apply only If a 
buyer clearly Is making an Investment and 
doesn't plan to be involved in running the 
company. 
Justice Powell acknowledged that the 
decision may create work for the federal 
courts, but he said parties to a transaction 
must know whether federal securities law 
applies. 
___ __;__~.;-_ _..;;. _____ -l In one ruling, the high court reversed 
Finn Dou.m. Pillows 
For complete 
bedtime comfort, 
select the finest · 
down pillows 
money can buy ·at 
factory direct 
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the decision of a federal appeals court In 
san Francisco, which threw out a securi-
ties-fraud lawsuit by a small group of In-
vestors that bought all of the stock In Lan-
dreth rtmber Co., a sawmlll In Tonasket, 
Wash . . The high court's rulln~ reinstates 
the lawsuit against the former owners. 
In the other ease, the . Supreme Court 
upheld a decision by a federal appeals 
court in Philadelphia. That decision 
cleared the way for trial of a securities-
fraud lawsuit by the buyer of 50% of the · 
stock In Continental Import &: Export Inc., 
a wlne-and-~pirits Importer. . · 
Justice John Stevens dissented In both 
cases. 
The rulings suppoJ1 the position taken 
by the Securities and Exchange Commts-· 
slon in friend-of-the-court brief:!. .• 
corre~ sleeping posture for the 
shoulders. If you don't enjoy the best 
night's sleep you've ever hlld, simply · 
return it to us for a complete refund. 
Delivery: We !!hip within 24 to 48 hrs. Rent Control ' 
.... TO ORDER CALL TOU.·FREE · .....~: 
- HI00-356-9367, Ext. H4l9, Tne jUstices said'tbey w1ll review the le-
or use the coupon below. Or, • p.ltty of city rent-eontrol laws that ate 
caD Or: write lor your free catalott • adopted Without · Jpectflc ·approval . from 
fea=down comforter etyles, state legislatures. A crouP of landlords ap-
down · ws, 4esianer clown 'Wls, pealed a nillng of the Callfornla Supreme 
100~ · o WoOl mattrell 'peds,-and , Court rejecting arguments that a rent-con-
many"other natlira1JJioducb C1esigned to trol law, approved In 1980 by voters In 
Improve the quality Of )'\Mlr We. Berkeley, violates · federal antitrust law. 
_Q _ :M ·-~---® The landlords contend that rent .control 
•• _,. illegally restrains commerce and trade. 
---- -- and they asked the Supreme Court to rule 
FIRM OOWN P LOWS · on that question. 
I · 
110 
.. Down190! Nall)pltGK - COYII'I I l'he biglr court bas said tba1 cities are 
~:ir~ ~".!6· t::::f t:: 1: ~ ::mg ~ exempt from federal antitrust laws for pro-
1 
OKina- 20'" •l6" ,~ ltdail SUO OUR·PitiCE SZ51 grams that a}>l.noud• anti-competitiVe are 
Colon: o.,.... Blue 0 ... DWhite ' • UJV\16" • 
.... ORDER 8Y PkONt 'rolJ...FR.EE ' · specifically authori%ed and supervised by · 1·- t~7Ext. HG9. · 1 the state. In the Berkeley ease, the Su· 
I OM.C~ YQ;;: '*t~ c::.m IY~ 1 preme Court also is being asked to decide Ali:d.l ' ""'· Dt.__ ·whether the city is entitled to any exemp-
t oSend r:- . QlY .a·t · ~ 1 Uon. · · eaw... -----. x s ' j :: Tbe decision bl the case, probably next 
I . Shlp.,~nce·SUo •· -s I spring, may have limited effect. Rent con· TOTAL-s 1 trolln ~ew York Clty is authorized by the 
I~ state and almoSt certainly is exempt frmn 
fected; . according to the National Multi 
Housing Council, a trade association for 
builders and developers of rental hous-
Ing. Lawyer Advertisfng 
The high court ruled that the First 
Amendment protects lawyers who use Il-
lustrations and offer truthful legal advice 
In newspaper and magazine advertising 
that solicits clients. 
The jtistlces said Ohio officials couldn't 
legally reprimand a lawyer who Included a 
sketch of a Dalkon Shield intrauterine 
birth-control device In a newspaper ad that 
also advised women that they might be 
able to sue the manufacturer If they were 
injured by the device. 
But the justices upheld the state's repri-
mand of the lawyer, Philip Zauderer of Co-
lumbus, Ohio, for his failure to fully dis-
close In the ad the possible costs of a law-
suit against the manufacturer, A.H. Robins 
Co. The requirement that costs be dis-
closed, the court .said, protects the con-
sumer. 
The decision, which gives lawyers more 
freedom to solicit clients through advertis-
ing, was written by Justice Byron Wliite. 
The court was unanimous on the use ,of Il-
lustrations. 
The ruling on legal advice was .5-3, with 
Justice Sandra O'Connor dissenting, joined 
by Chief Justice Warren Burger and Jus-
tice William Rehnquist. The decision on 
disclosure of costs was 6-2, with Justice 
William Brennan dissenting, joined by Jus-
tice Thurgood Marshall. Justice Powell 
didn't take part in the case. 
· Forro Precision 
The justices refused to bear an appeal 
by Forro Precision Inc., a Los Angeles 
area manufacturer of electronic data-pro-
cessing equipment. 
A federal jury awarded Forro $2.7 ffiil-
lion In a lawsuit that accused International 
Business Machines Corp. of Interference 
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83 - 1961 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OCTOBER TERM, 1984 
IVAN K. LANDRETH, LUCILLE LANDRETH, 
THOMAS E. LANDRETH, IVAN K. LANDRETH, JR., 
AND KATHLEEN LANDRETH, RESPONDENTS. 
MOTION FOR CLARIFICATION OF FACTS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Respondents Ivan K. Landreth, Lucille Landreth, Thomas 
E. Landreth, Ivan K. Landreth, Jr., and Kathleen Landreth 
("Landreths'') respectfully move for clarification of certain 
facts in this Court's May 28, 1985 opinion in the above captioned 
matter. 
II. REASONS FOR REQUESTED CLARIFICATION 
Respondents request that the Court add certain prefatory 
comments to factual statements in the opinion so that it is clear 
that these statements represent allegations of the petitioner, 
~
rather than findings of fact by the district court below. With 
respect to each of these statements, no factual determination was 
made by the district court. The only issue decided by the dis-
trict court was whether the sale of respondents' sawmill business 
was the sale of a security under the federal securities acts. 
The issue was determined on summary judgment. No factual deter-
Motion for Clarification 
of Facts - 1 
1~ 
I V 
minations were made on petitioner's claims of fraud and misrepre-
sentation. Furthermore, these allegations are vigorously con-
tested by respondents. Thus, various factual statements in this 
Court's opinion represent allegations of the parties, not find-
ings of fact. 
III. REQUESTED CLARIFICATION 
The clarification requested by respondents can be 
accomplished in several ways. 
First, clarification of all facts may be made by a 
general applicable revision such as adding the statement by 
footnote: "Factual statements herein represent allegations of 
the parties, construed most favorably for petitioner as the non-
moving party on summary judgment. The Court recognizes that many 
of these facts are contested by respondents." 
Second, the Court can add the phrase "petitioner alleges 
the following facts" at the outset of various factual recitations 
found in the opinion at Page 1, line 5; Page 2, line 11; and Page 
14, line 4. 
Third, if the Court rejects the first two alternatives, 
at the very least the Court should clarify the following state-____________. 
ments so it is clear that these represent allegations of peti-
tioner rather than findings of fact: 
l. PAGE l, LINE 7: 
The Landreth family offered their stock for sale 
through both Washington and out-of-state brokers. 
. . . Despite the fire, the broker continued to offer 
the stock for sale. (Emphasis added). 
Respondents offered their "business" for sale. The 
to a stock sale. 
Landreth Timber Company listing, C.R. 93). 
Motion for Clarification 
of Facts - 2 
(See 
2. PAGE 1, LINE 14: 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, 
received a letter offering the stock for sale. On the 
basis of the letter's representations ... Dennis 
became interested in acquiring the stock. 
In fact, the letter offered a sawmill for sale and did 
not mention stock. (J.A. 96-100). Also respondents will present 
evidence at trial establishing that Dennis relied on the advice 
of experts retained by him, not alleged statements of respondents 
in deciding to purchase the mill. Respondents accordingly 
request that this statement be revised to include the language 
"Petitioner alleges that Samuel Dennis II 
3. PAGE 2, LINE 11: 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did 
not live up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding 
costs exceeded earlier estimates, and new components 
turned out to be incompatible with existing equipment. 
These allegations were not addressed on the merits by 
the district court below and are disputed by respondents. (Brief 
of Respondents at 2 n.5). These issues relate to petitioner's 
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation which are not properly 
before this Court and remain to be resolved at trial. Accord-
ingly, this statement should be modified to read: "Petitioner 
alleges that after the acquisition was completed •. Rebuild-
ing costs, as alleged by petitioner, exceeded earlier estimates 
II 
4. PAGE 14, LINE 2: 
We think even that assertion is open to some question, 
however, as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of run-
ning the sawmill themselves. Ivan Landreth apparently 
stayed on to manage the daily affairs of the business. 
Petitioner admits that Ivan Landreth did not stay on to 
manage the daily affairs of the business. Rather, Phil Cook, the 
new manager retained by petitioner before closing, was placed in 
Motion for Clarification 
of Facts - 3 
charge of the mill. After closing, Landreth was merely a consul-
tant, terminable without cause upon 30 days notice. (J.A. 186-
88, 190-98, 297-99). The admitted facts also establish that 
Dennis and Bolten became officers and directors of Landreth 
Timber Company. (J.A. 186). To the extent that petitioner 
alleges continuing fraud and mismanagement in reconstruction of 
the sawmill, the trial court below must determine whether Dennis, 
Bolten, Cook, or Landreth were responsible for mill operations 
and reconstruction after closing of the sale. Consequently, 
these statements should be revised as follows: 
We think even that assertion is open to some question, 
however, as petitioner alleges that Dennis and Bolten 
had no intention of running the sawmill themselves. 
Petitioner also alleges that Ivan Landreth stayed on to 
manage the daily affairs of the business. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons previously set forth, respondent's 
motion for Clarification of Facts should be granted. 
Respectfully submitted this tZ~ day of June, 1985. 
PEREY & SMITH 
~ Ci.-..Q.'S' A · ~~ j 1'\. ~~ =?.&c 
James A.Smith Jr. 
Julia Langley 
Suite 701, Market 
Place One 
2001 Western Avenue 
Seattle, WA 98121 
(206) 223-1588 
Motion for Clarification 
of Facts - 4 
BOGLE & GATES 
~ \=>. ~~c:L.fl~cr- b I :PH-c 
Guy P. Michelson 
Patricia H. Char 
Richard D. Vogt 
2200 Bank of California 
Center 
Seattle, WA 98164 
(206) 682-5151 
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MEMORANDUM T JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 83-1961 Landr th Timber Co. v. Landreth 
in Our Opinion Motion of Respondents to 
Attached is a motion respondents requesting the 
Court to clarify the facts in ou decision in this case. -------=-------Respondents wish us to make clear~hat the facts as we state them 
are simply alleged by petrs: because the case comes up on a 
motion for summary judgment, no factual rulings have been made by 
It is true that our opinion does not specify that the 
facts are as alleged by petrs. However, nowhere do we state that 
they were so found by the DC, and we do note on p. 2 that the 
-----------..._ 
case came up on a motion for summary judgment. I am inclined to 
~
think the motion should be denied. If you wish to consider it 
further, Mr. Stevas has offered to call for a response from 
petrs. 
tp/zt!) 
f.1L ~ ~AL-(_ ~
~4-1-4~~~ 
~ rf4R . 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
OFFICE OF THE CLERK 
WASHINGTON. D . C . 20543 
June 14, 1985 
MEMORANDUM FOR JUSTICE POWELL 
FROM: ALEXANDER L. STEVAS !/) 
RE: Case No. 83-1961, Landreth Timber v. Landreth 
In the above case wherein you authored the opinion which 
was released on May 28, 1985, I have received the attached motion 
from counsel for respondents. I do not believe this is a motion 
which should be directed to the full Court and indeed you may 
wish to deny it or ignore it. 
Alternatively, you may wish to defer awaiting a response 
from petitioners or you may wish to direct me to call upon 
petitioners for a response. I have not caused the to be 
filed pending further instructions from you . .... ____ 
Attachment 
lgd June 22, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 83-1961 Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth 
I checked the appendix and read the letter received by 
Samuel Dennis. In fact, it does not mention the stock, so to be 
perfectly accurate, we should change the first sentence of the 
second paragraph in Part I to read: "Samuel Dennis, a 
Massachusetts tax attorney, received a letter offering the 
~siness for sale." It is, however, accurate to say, as we do in 
the first paragraph, that "[t)he Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both washington and out-of-state brokers." 
In light of what we have discussed about the fact that 
the opinion makes clear the case is here on summary judgment, I 
am not sure that it will make much difference whether we make 
this change. Making the change would, however, make the opinion 
more accurate. 
June 24, 1985 
83-1961 Landreth Timber Co. et al v. Landreth, et al. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Counsel for respondents has filed a "motion for 
clarification of facts" that the Clerk referred to me. 
Counsel for petitioners have advised the Clerk that they 
will make no response. 
The substance of the motion i.s that we make it 
explicj.tly clear that our statement of facts represents al-
legations of petitioners rather than findinqs of fact by the 
District Court, and that we refer to the fact that sale of 
the "business" as well as sale of the stock was mentioned. 
We d i.d say that respondents "moved for summary 
judgment", and that the DC granted the motion and dismissed 
the complaint for want of fef!eral jurisdiction. Sllp opin-
ion, o. 2. Nevertheless, I am willing to add at the very 
beginning of Part I the following: 
"The facts, as alleged by Petitioners, are as 
follows:" 
In addition, I am clarifying the first sentence in 
the second paragraph on p. 1 to read as follows: 
"Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax 
attorney, received a letter offering the 
business for sale". 
In the preceding paragraph, we accurately stated 
that the family offered their stock for sale through both 
Washington and out-of-stAte brokers, and - of course - the 
deal as neqotiated was only for the sale of stock. 
Absent objection, the foregoing will be added, and 
Henry Lind and the Clerk will be so advised. 
r ... F.P., Jr. 
ss 
"""""----~-. -··-~-~-- --------------· . ..,.......,-~-------~-----___.,.·.-----
1st DRAFT 








From: Justice Stevens 
rflr-'Y 15 !985 
Circulated: _________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1961 
LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER v. 
IV AN K. LANDRETH ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May-, 1985] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
In my opinion, Congress did not intend the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws to apply to every transac-
tion in a security described in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act: 1 
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury 
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement, ... investment contract, voting-trust certifi-
cate, ... or in general, any interest or instrument com-
monly known as a 'security."' 15 U. S. C. § 77b(l). 
See also n. 1, ante. 
Congress presumably adopted this sweeping definition "to 
prevent the financial community from evading regulation by 
inventing new types of financial instruments rather than to 
prevent the courts from interpreting the Act in light of its 
purposes." Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 201 (CA7 1982). 
Moreover, the "broad statutory definition is preceded ... by 
the statement that the terms mentioned are not to be consid-
ered securities if 'the context otherwise requires . . . . ' 
'Cf. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc ., 457 F.2d 274, 275-~76 (CA7) 
(STEVENS, J., for the court), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) ("we do not 
believe every conceivable arrangement that would fit a dictionary defini-
tion of an investment contract was intended to be included within the statu-
tory definition of a security"). 
83-1961-DISSENT 
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"Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982). 
The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts 
makes clear that Congress was primarily concerned with 
transactions in securities that are traded in a public market. 
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 
837 (1975), the Court observed: 
"The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was 
to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated se-
curities market. The focus of the Acts is on the capital 
market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to 
raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges 
on which securities are traded, and the need for regula-
tion to prevent fraud and protect the interest of inves-
tors. Congress intended the application of these stat-
utes to turn on the economic realities underlying a 
transaction, and not on the name appended thereto." 
Id., at 849. 
I believe that Congress wanted to protect investors who do 
not have access to inside information and who are not in a 
position to protect themselves from fraud by obtaining appro-
priate contractual warranties. 
At some level of analysis, the policy of Congress must pro-
vide the basis for placing limits on the scope of the Securities 
Acts. The economic realities of a transaction may determine 
whether "unusual instruments" fall within the scope of the 
Act, ante, at 8, and whether an ordinary commercial "note" is 
covered, id., at 10-11. The negotiation of an individual 
mortgage note, for example, surely would not be covered by 
the Act, although a note is literally a "security" under the 
definition. Cf. Chemical Bank v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 
726 F. 2d 930, 937 (CA2), cert. denied, - U.S. -
(1984). The marketing of a large portfolio of mortgage 
loans, however, might well be. See Sanders v. John 
Nuveen & Co., 463 F. 2d 1075, 1079-1080 (CA7), cert. 
denied, 409 U. S. 1009 (1972). 
83-1961-DISSENT 
LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH 3 
I believe that the characteristics of the entire transaction 
are as relevant in determining whether a transaction in 
"stock" is covered by the Act as they are in transactions 
involving "notes," "investment contracts," or the more 
hybrid securities. Providing regulations for the trading of 
publicly listed stock-whether on an exchange or in the over-
the-counter market-was the heart of Congress' legislative 
program, and even private sales of such securities are surely 
covered by the Acts. I am not persuaded, however, that 
Congress intended to cover negotiated transactions involving 
the sale of control of a business whose securities have never 
been offered or sold in any public market. In the latter 
cases, it is only a matter of interest to the parties whether 
the transaction takes the form of a sale of stock or a sale of 
assets, and the decision usually hinges on matters that are ir-
relevant to the federal securities laws such as tax liabilities, 
the assignability of Government licenses or other intangible 
assets, and the allocation of the accrued or unknown liabil-
ities of the going concern. If Congress had intended to pro-
vide a remedy for every fraud in the sale of a going concern 
or its assets, it would not have permitted the parties to bar-
gain over the availability of federal jurisdiction. 
In short, I would hold that the antifraud rovisions of the 
federal securities laws are inapplicable unless the transaction 
involves (i) the sale of a s;;;rity t'liat ~ded in a p~lic 
market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a osition to negotiate --- ~-
appropriate contractual warranties ana to insist on access to 
inSi e I orma matmg t e transaction . Of 
course,liiitir tl1e precise contours 0 such a standard could be 
marked out in a series of litigated proceedings, some uncer-
tainty in the coverage of the statute would be unavoidable. 
Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the interests in certainty 
and predictability that are associated with a simple "bright-








4 LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH 
to reach substantive evils far outside the scope of the legisla-
ture's concern." Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d, at 202. 
Both of these cases involved a sale of stock in a closely-held 
corporation. In each case the transaction was preceded by 
comprehensive negotiations between the buyer and seller. 
There is no suggestion that the buyers were unable to obtain 
appropriate warranties or to insist on the exchange and inde-
pendent evaluation of relevant financial information before 
entering into the transaction. 2 I do not believe Congress 
intended that the federal securities laws govern the private 
sale of a 'substantial ownershi interest 'in these operating 
businesses simply because the transactions were structured 
as sales of stock instead of assets. 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in No. 
83-1961 and reverse the judgment in No. 84-165. 
2 Indeed, in No. 83-1961, the parties entered into a lengthy Stock Pur-
chase Agreement containing extensive warranties and other protections 
for the purchasers. App. 206-263. 
05/02 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: ________ _ 
Recirculated: MA.'l' 2 -
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1961 
LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER v. 
IV AN K. LANDRETH ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the 
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumbe.r company. 
t 
83-1961-0PINION 
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some 
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant 
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis as-
signed the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation 
formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company 
stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, form-
ing petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then 
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of 
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class 
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that re-
spondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 7ea et seq. 
(the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
knowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
majority'' of courts that had held that the federal securities 
83-1961-0PINION 
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), 
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be consid-
ered a "security'' unless the purchaser had entered into the 
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived 
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control 
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers, 
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture 
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affinned the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Dan-
iel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77b(1), defines a "security'' as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
4 
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
lmown as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those charac-
teristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right 
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of 
1 We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in§ 3(a)(10) 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Hausing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Fcmnan, 421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975). 
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or 
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in propor-
tion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to 
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851. 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the 
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. More-
over, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction in-
volved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of 
the kind of context to which the Acts normally appl;y-. It is 
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor 
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of 
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as 
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in en-
1 Although we did not so specify in ForrruJ,n, we wish to make clear here 
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock, 
the kind of stock ordinarily at issue in cases involving the sale of a business. 
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and 
still be covered by the Acts. 
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types 
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security.'" SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 
328 U. S., at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess., 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that Congress did 
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all 
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we 
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad defuPtion 
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here 
falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner.3 Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treat-
ing notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories 
differently. We address these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
• Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L. 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at 
11-12. 
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933 
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a 
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in-
terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of 
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace." 
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such 
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as 
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under 
terms or courses of dealing which established their character 
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid. 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the 
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could 
be considered a "security'' if the circumstances of the trans-
action so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of 
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract 
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the pro-
ceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering con-
stituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers." 328 U. S., at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were ''investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
''investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their 
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of 
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our 
cases require us in every case to look to the economic sub-
stance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of oth-
ers, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, re-
spondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character:.. 
ized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts 
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been 
4 Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967), 
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
gument that we have mandated in every case a detennination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings 
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a pri-
vately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit 
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of 
deposit, for a security." 
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions in-
dicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls 
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in 
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly 
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as 
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteris-
tics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security'' simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." I d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac-
teristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5. 
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality 
test was designed to determine whether a particular instru-
ment is an ''investment contract," not whether it fits within 
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "se-
curity." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Team-
'In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Howey test whenever it detennines whether an instrument is a "security," 
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes 
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security'" (quoting 
Formo,n, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as 
respondents do. We made the statement in Formo,n in reference to the 
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and 
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] com-
monly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. We stated, 
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sters v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the 
Howey test to "detennine whether a particular financial rela-
tionship constitutes an investment contract"); United Hous-
ing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see 
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to tradi-
tional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the 
statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration of 
many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. 
Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin 
v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the .. transfer of 
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p. 
Eliminating from the definition of "security'' instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord, 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Further-
more, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. '§ 77d(2), 
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration pro-
visions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud 
as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were ''investment con-
tracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between 
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "secu-
rity."'" 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the 
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a 
security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we per-
ceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the in-
struments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly 
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a 
'security."' Under either of these general categories, the Howey test 
would apply. 
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provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts re-
fute respondents' position. 6 
B 
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating 
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics means that other categories listed in the stat-
utory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same 
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes 
or other instruments may be provable by their name and 
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think 
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other 
categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock ''represents to many people, both trained and 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be-
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at 
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditiOI·lal stock 
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining 
whether an instrument is an ''investment contract" to tradi-
• In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does 
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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tiona! stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though 
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp. , 
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiner's 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. A.s we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Goverrwrs, 468 U. S. -- (1984), "note" 
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encom-
passes instruments with widely varying characteristics, de-
pending on whether issued in a consumer context, as com-
mercial paper, or in some other investment context. See 
id., at --. We here expressly leave until another day the 
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category 
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by 
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" 
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of 
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doc-
trine depends in each case on whether control has passed to 
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the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this 
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% 
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question, however, 
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill 
themselves. Ivan Landreth apparently stayed on to manage 
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who 
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser 
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so 
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive inves-
tor not engaged in the daily management of the business. 
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doc-
trine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for 
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of 
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Lawsf"W7,...~7:;----') 
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District cb\u-t 
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even 
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of 
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 13a. 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale 
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in 
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This 
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing. 
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on 
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as 
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and 
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain 
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at --, decided 
today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts 
would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to the par-
ties at the time the stock was sold. We believe these uncer-
tainties attending the applicability of the Acts would be intol-
erable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9 
(rejecting the argument that the certificate of deposit at issue 
• 
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there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" 
once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting peti-
tioner's approach will increase the workload of the federal 
courts by converting state and common law fraud claims into 
federal claims. We find more daunting, however, the pros-
pect that parties to a transaction may never know whether 
they are covered by the Acts until they engage in extended j 
discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the 
passage of control. Accord, Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d') a.r 
1145-1146. 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "se-
curity'' within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 












From: Justice Stevens 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
. Nos. 83-1961 AND 84-165 
LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER 
83-1961 v. 
IV AN K. LANDRETH ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
84-165 
W. GEORGE GOULD, PETITIONER 
v. 
MAX A. RUEFENACHT ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
[May -, 1985] 
JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
In my opinion, Congress did not intend the antifraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws to apply to every transac-
tion in a security described in § 2(1) of the 1933 Act: 1 
"The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury 
stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, cer-
tificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing 
agreement, . . . investment contract, voting-trust cer-
tificate, ... or in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a 'security."' 15 U. S. C. § 77b(1). 
See also n. 1, ante. 
'Cf. Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275-276 (CA7) 
(STEVENS, J., for the court), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) ("we do not 
believe every conceivable arrangement that would fit a dictionary defini-
tion of an investment contract was intended to be included within the statu-
tory definition of a security''). 
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Congress presumably adopted this sweeping definition "to 
prevent the financial community from evading regulation by 
inventing new types of financial instruments rather than to 
prevent the courts from interpreting the Act in light of its 
purposes." Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d 197, 201 (CA7 1982). 
Moreover, the "broad statutory definition is preceded ... by 
the statement that the terms mentioned are not to be consid-
ered securities if 'the context otherwise requires . . . . '" 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982). ' 
The legislative history of the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts 
makes clear that Congress was primarily concerned with 
transactions in securities that are traded in a public market. 
In United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 
837 (1975), the Court observed: 
"The primary purpose of the Acts of 1933 and 1934 was 
to eliminate serious abuses in a largely unregulated se-
curities market. The focus of the Acts is on the capital 
market of the enterprise system: the sale of securities to 
raise capital for profit-making purposes, the exchanges 
on which securities are traded, and the need for regu-
lation to prevent fraud and protect the interest of in-
vestors. Congress intended the application of these 
statutes to turn on the economic realities underlying a 
transaction, and not on the name appended thereto." 
Id., at 849. 
I believe that Congress wanted to protect investors who do 
not have access to inside information and who are not in a 
position to protect themselves from fraud by obtaining appro-
priate contractual warranties. 
At some level of analysis, the policy of Congress must pro-
vide the basis for placing limits on the coverage of the Securi-
ties Acts. The economic realities of a transaction may deter-
mine whether "unusual instruments" fall within the scope of 
the Act, ante, at 8, and whether an ordinary commercial 
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"note" is covered, id. , at 10-11. The negotiation of an indi-
vidual mortgage note, for example, surely would not be cov-
ered by the Act, although a note is literally a "security" 
under the definition. Cf. Chemical Bank v. Arthur Ander-
sen & Co., 726 F. 2d 930, 937 (CA2), cert. denied,- U. S. 
-- (1984). The marketing to the public of a large portfolio 
of mortgage loans, however, might well be. See Sanders v. 
John Nuveen & Co., 463 F. 2d 1075, 1079-1080 (CA7), cert. 
denied, 409 U. S. ·1009 (1972). 
I believe that the characteristics of the entire transaction 
are as relevant in determining whether a transaction in 
"stock" is covered by the Act as they are in transactions in-
volving "notes," "investment contracts," or the more hybrid 
securities. Providing regulations for the trading of publicly 
listed stock-whether on an exchange or in the over-the-
counter market-was .the heart of Congress' legislative pro-
gram, and even private sales of such securities are surely 
covered by the Acts. I am not persuaded, however, that 
Congress intended to cover negotiated transactions involving 
the sale of control of a business whose securities have never 
been offered or sold in any public market. In the latter 
cases, it is only a matter of interest to th~ parties whether 
the transaction takes the form of a sale of stock or a sale of 
assets, and the decision usually hinges on matters that are ir-
relevant to the federal securities laws such as tax liabilities, 
the assignability of Government licenses or other intangible 
assets, and the allocation of the accrued or unknown liabil-
ities of the going concern. If Congress had intended to pro-
vide a remedy for every fraud in the sale of a going concern 
or its assets, it would not have permitted the parties to bar-
gain over the availability of federal jurisdiction. 
In short, I would hold that the antifraud provisions of the 
federal securities laws are inapplicable unless the transaction 
involves (i) the sale of a security that is traded in a public 
market; or (ii) an investor who is not in a position to negotiate 
appropriate contractual warranties and to insist on access to 
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inside information before consummating the transaction. Of 
course, until the precise contours of such a standard could be 
marked out in a series of litigated proceedings, some uncer-
tainty in the coverage of the statute would be unavoidable. 
Nevertheless, I am persuaded that the interests in certainty 
and predictability that are associated with a simple "bright-
line" rule are not strong enough to "justify expanding liability 
to reach substantive evils far outside the scope of the legisla-
ture's concern." 2 · Sutter v. Groen, 687 F. 2d, at 202. • 
Both of these cases involved a sale of stock in a closely-held 
corporation. In each case the transaction was preceded by 
comprehensive negotiations between the buyer and seller. 
There is no suggestion that the buyers were unable to obtain 
appropriate warranties or to insist on the exchange and inde-
pendent evaluation of relevant financial information before 
entering into the transactions. 3 I do not believe Congress 
intended the federal securities laws to govern the private 
sale of a substantial ownership interest in these operating 
businesses simply because the transactions were structured 
as sales of stock instead of assets. 
2 In final analysis, the Court relies on its own evaluation of the relevant 
"policy considerations." See ante, at 12-15 and especially n. 7. While I 
agree that policy considerations are relevant in construing the Securities 
Acts, I would prefer to rely principally on the policies of Congress as re-
flected in the legislative history. If extrinsic considerations are to be 
given effect, I would place a far different evaluation on the weight of the 
conflicting policies, largely because I strongly believe that this Court 
should presume that federal legislation is not intended to displace state au-
thority unless Congress has plainly indicated an intent to do so. See e. g., 
Bennett v. New Jersey, -- U. S. --, --, n. 16 (1985) (STEVENS, J., 
dissenting); Garcia v. United States, -- U. S. --, -- (1984) (STE-
VENS, J., dissenting); Michigan v. Long, -- U.S. --, -- (1983) 
(STEVENS, J., dissenting); United States v. Altobella, 442 F. 2d 310, 316 
(CA7 1971) (STEVENS, J., for the court) Cf. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U. S. 456, 477 (1981) (STEVENS, J., dissenting). 
3 Indeed, in No. 83-1961, the parties entered into a lengthy Stock Pur-
chase Agreement containing extensive warranties and other protections 
for the purchasers. App. 206-263. 
83-1961 & 84-165---DISSENT 
LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH 5 
I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in 
No. 83-1961 and reverse the judgment in No. 84-165. 
No. 83-1961 
LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER, v. IVAN K. LANDRETH, 
et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
[April ___ , 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all 
of the stock of a company is a securities transaction 
2. 
subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws (the Acts). 
I 
This action arises out of the sale by respondents Ivan 
K. Landreth and his sons of all of the outstanding stock 
of a closely held lumber business they owned and 
operated in Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family 
offered their stock for sale through both Washington and 
out-of-state broker i:. ~efore - a purchaser was found~ 
company's sawmill was heavily damaged by 
fire. Despite the fire, the brokers continued to offer 
a.~ 
the stock for sale, riif>ort ,i ng t tfat the mill would be 
completely rebuilt and modernized. 
3. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale and making certain 
a4..J..e, 
representations abotlt the extent of the rebuilding plans, 
the predicted productivity of the mill, existing 
contracts, and expected profits • Dennis was interested 
..f.~ ,Lo 
and contaoted John Bolten, a former client who had retired 
to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill 
conducted, Dennis agreed to purchase all of the common 
stock in the lumber company, and Ivan Landreth agreed to 
stay on as a consultant for some time to help with the 
daily operations of the mill. Dennis assigned the stock 
to B & D Company, a company formed for the sole purpose of 
acquiring the lumber company stock. B & D then merged 
with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth 
4. 
Timber Company. Dennis and Bolten owned all of 
petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of the 
equity, and six other investors together owned the Class B 
stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not 
live up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs 
exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out 
to be incompatible with existing equipment. 
~~.a_~ 
Eventually, 
petitioner sold the mill and went into receivership. 
A 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the 
sale of stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that 
respondents had widely offered and then sold their stock 
without registering it as required by the Securities Act 
of 1933, 15 u.s.c. §77a, et seq., (the 1933 Act). 




or intentionally made misrepresentations or had failed to 
~1-o 
state material facts ~t the worth and prospects of the 
lumber 
~~ 
compa~~·~~ ~c~o~nmt~Ieeec~t~i~o~n~r-~~~~l~·~~h ~tbbaa--••~t~o~c~k~~s~a~l~e,~ in 
violation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 
u.s.c. §78a, et seq. (the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called .. sale of business .. doctrine, 
petitioner had not purchased a "security" within the 
meaning of those Acts. The District Court granted 
respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want 
of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal 
statutes include "stock" as one of the instruments 
constituting a .. security, .. and that the stock at issue 
possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
6. 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the 
"growing majority" of courts that had held that the 
federal securities laws do not apply to the sale of 100% 
of the stock of a closely held corporation. Petn App. 
13a. Relying on United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 
u.s. 837 (1975), and SEC v. w.J. Howey Co., 328 u.s. 293 
~ ffi--,.1-.Je-...J-
(1946), ~~ ruled that the stock could not be considered a 
"security" unless the purchaser had entered into the 
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits 
derived from the efforts of others. Finding that 
managerial control of the business had passed into the 
hands of the purchasers, and thus, that the transaction 
was a commercial venture rather than a typical investment, 
the District Court dismissed the complaint. 
~4/ 
7. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the District Court's application of the 
sale of business doctrine. It agreed that it was bound by 
Forman and Howey, supra, to determine in every case 
whether the economic realities 
indicated that the Acts applied~ 
~a use the Courts of Appeals 
of the transaction 
are S!e T Y..sl.y divided 
over the applicability of the federal securities laws when 
a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its stock, 
we granted certiorari. u.s. (1984). We now 
reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every 
case involving construction of a statute is the language 
itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 
8. 
723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J. , concurring); accord 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 u.s. 
551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 u.s.c. 
§77b(l), defines a "security" as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, 
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in 
general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 1 security, 1 or any certificate of 
interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee 
of, or warrant or right to ~ubscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing." 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
1we have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of 
"security" in §3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act and §2(1) of the 
1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as 
such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 847 
n.l2 (1975). 
9. 
broad, Marine Bank v. weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry 
well-settled meaning, as well as instruments of nmore 
variable character [that] were necessarily designated by 
more descriptive terms,u such as 8 investment contractu and 
8 instrument commonly known as a 'security.•n SEC v. c. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344, 351 (1943). The face 
of the definition shows that 8 Stockn is considered to be a 
A 
8 Securityn within the meaning of the O:t n s we observed 
in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title 
are likely to be covered by the definition. Id., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, h~the fact 
that instruments bear the label 8 Stockn is not of itself 
sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we 
10. 
concluded that we must also determine whether those 
instruments possess "some of the significant 
characteristics typically associated with" stock, id., at 
851, recognizing that when an instrument is both called 
"stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, "a 
purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal 
securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those 
character is tics usually associated with stock as ( i) the 
right to receive dividends contingent upon an 
apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the 
ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (iv) the ability to 
confer voting rights in proportion to the number of shares 
owned; and (v} the capacity to appreciate in value. Id. 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the 
instruments at issue there were not "securities" within 
11. 
the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of 
shares of stock entitling the purchaser to lease an 
apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none 
of the characteristics listed above that are usually 
associated with traditional stock. Moreover, we concluded 
that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that 
the purchasers had been misled by use of the word "stock" 
into thinking that the federal securities laws governed 
their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire 
low-cost subsidized living space for their personal use; 
no one was likely to have believed 
were purchasing investment securities. Id., at 851. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved 
here possesses all of the characteristics we identified in 
Forman as traditionally associated with stock. Indeed, 
12. 
the District Court so found. Petn App. 13a. Moreover, 
unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved 
here--the sale of stock in a corporation--is typical of 
the context to which the Acts normally apply. It is thus 
much more likely here than in Forman that an investor 
would believe he was covered by the federal securities 
laws. Under the circumstances of this case, the plain 
meaning of the statutory definition mandates that the 
stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage 
of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of 
stock at issue here comports with Congress's remedial 
purpose in enacting the legislation to protect investors 
by "compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the 
issuance of 'the many types of instruments that in our 
13. 
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a 
security." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 
(1946) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 
(1933)) 0 Although we recognize that Congress did not 
intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud, 
Marine Bank v. weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 556 (1982), we think 
it would improperly narrow Congress's broad definition of 
"security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue 
here falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the 
a-
statutory analysis outlined above to be sufficient answer 
A 
11 . . d f . . 2 compe 1ng JU gment or pet1 t1oners. Respondents urge, 
2Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is 
sufficient. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities 
Footnote continued on next page. 
14. 
however, that language in our previous opinions, including 
Forman, requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and 
the characteristics of the instruments involved to 
determine whether application of the Acts is mandated by 
the economic substance of the transaction. Moreover, the 
Court of Appeals rejected the view that the plain meaning 
of the definition would be sufficient to hold this stock 
covered, because it saw "no principled way" to justify 
treating notes, bonds, and other of the definitional 




~eeeeRtially a a s 1 o 
a~ -") (emphasis in ot :i:giual), 
• s s a_ 
furtbe x:_ 
27 28. - -
15. 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely 
clear on the proper method of analysis for determining 
when an instrument is a "security." This Co.urt has 
decided a number of cases in which it looked to the 
economic substance of the transaction, rather than just to 
its form, to determine whether the Acts applied. In SEC 
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344 (1943), for 
example, the Court considered whether the 1933 Act applied 
a--
to the sale of leasehold interests in land nea51 proposed 
oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold 
interests were "securities," the Court noted that "the 
reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and 
commonplace." Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such 
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved 
as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt 
16. 
in under terms or courses of dealing which established 
their character in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or 
as 'any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
'security.'" Id., at 351. 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), further 
elucidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual 
instrument could be considered a "security" if the 
circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in 
that case was an offering of units of a citrus grove 
development coupled with a contract for cultivating and 
marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the 
~~ 
investors. The Court r~l~d that the offering constituted 
an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 1933 
Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[d] an investment of money in a common 
17. 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of 
others." Id., at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the 
second part of our decision in Forman, on which 
respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part 
II, supra, the first part of our decision in Forman 
concluded that the instruments at issue, while they bore 
the traditional label "stock," were not "securities" 
because they possessed none of the usual character is tics 
of stock. We then went on to address the argument that 
the instruments were "investment contracts." Applying the 
Howey test, we concluded that the instruments w9r 7 
~ 
likewise not "securities" by virtue of being "investment 
'\. 
contracts" because the economic realities of the 










their money not for the purpose of reaping profits from 
the efforts of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a 
7 'fw 
commodity for personal consumption. 421 u.s., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was require us to reject the 
~ 
pQssisi~~ that the shares of stock at issue here may be 
" tf.-~ considered 
~ £rw' 
"securities" because their name and of 
~~---
. 3Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 
u.s. 332 (1967), and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551 
(1982), as support for their argument that we have 
mandated in every case a determination of whether the 
economic realities of a transaction call for the 
application of the Acts. It is sufficient t0~ Y~ to note 
here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did 
not fit squarely within one of the enumerated specific 
kinds of securities listed in the definition. See pp. 19-
23, infra. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital 
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver 
involved a certificate of deposit and a privately 
negotiated profit sharing agreement. See 455 u.s. 551, at 
557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of 
deposit involved in Weaver did not fit within the 
definition's category "certificate of deposit, for a 
security." 
19. 
characteristics. Instead, they argue that our cases 
require in every case to the economic substance 
of the transaction to determine whether the Howey test has 
been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of 
others, but to buy a company that it could manage and 
control. Petitioner was not a passive investor of the 
kind Congress intended the Acts to protect, but an active 
entrepreneur, who sought to "use or consume" the business 
purchased just as the purchasers in Forman so~ght to use 
the apartments they acquired after purchasing shares of 
stock. Thus, respondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
~,~ ~ We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our 
8~j~j 
~~~ H~~ ,. cases. First, it is important to understand the contexts 
1/J.- ~?-t •• d .. t.-~~J,..i'_ 
,l"-<.,j~/...e.~ within which these cases were decided. All of the cases 
20. 
on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not 
easily characterized as "securities." Thus, if the Acts 
were to apply in those cases a~ all, it would have to have 
been because the economic reality underlying the 
transaction indicated that the instrument was actually of 
~t ftU..ts c.Ot. ~ -Ule ~ ~ ..c1 C).) 
a type \that "ifi oar eommer:cial -.iorld fall [s] witl=lin tl=le 
~ ncept of a security " Rep , No. 85, 13a 
_con~ . , 1st Sess. 11 ( 1 9~3) ~h~ Act:s' Jefini Lion of 
~ecurit:y" is quite broad, and as th~ Howey Court noted, 
.Congress intended iH the Acts to adopt a "flexible r ather 
"than a stat1c pr1nc1ple." 328 u.s., at 293. In order: to 
-..fnl fill CoH9ress 's purpose of promoting fnll and :fa-i l'-
"El:i sclosu:re to protect the inves Ling publ io, see Marine 
· Bank: v. weaver, 455 u.s. 551 , 556 (1982), th1s Cou r t has--
felt eoftstrain~J in the case of unusua l iHse:rum~nts to 
21. 
]:.Qok --deeper-to i:he-eeonomic subs lance to-de-te-r-mi-ne whether 
-the P..ct-s -governed. In the case at bar, in contrast, the 
instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly within 
the statutory definition.~ere is no need here, as there 
~~ 
was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characte~ of 
instrument to determine whether the Acts appl~ 
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has 
never foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found 
to be a "security" simply because it is what it purports 
to be. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344 
(1943) , the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words 
of the Act; we merely accept them. In some cases, 
[proving that the documents were securities] might be done 
by proving the document itself, which on its face would be 
a note, a bond, or a share of stock." Id., at 355. 
22. 
~ame alone given to an instrument ma¥ not be djsposjtive, 
it also is not ~~elevant, where the instrument b~e 
l:i-Bilal in<'Hcia of stock, the Court wjJl give proper effect 
to the name. 421 u s., at eso 251. Respondents are 
correct that in Forman we eschewed a "literal" approach 
that would invoke the Acts' coverage simply because the 
instrument carried the label "stock ... Forman does not, 
however, eliminate the Court's ability to hold that an 
instrument is covered when its character is tics bear out 
the label. ~ ff· ll-10 1 ~ • 
{ , ftsa 1 &~, 
c_:eoond, we would note that the Howey test was designed 
to determine whether a particular instrument is an 
"investment contract," not whether it fits within~ of 
the examples listed in the statutory definition of 
,, ,el I 
~-terAA+t" rt-4 
~~lu-ot-L !{ ~~r2A;! 
;~ 
11 security ... 
23. 
OM Ult?eS ~c~ witt\~ vit?W. 
~u~'-4-etl l..f.eu-~ ~Qv-... v. For~ I 
~rDI.. • ~ -f · \( 1 ~c-.. · 
'Forman appl i ed the tes l only to the argument 
that t:he instruments at :i:-ssue there, if not stock, were-
"' inves ~ment contracts ... International 
6~ 
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 u.s. 551 (1979) J-
' 
\tJQ r ej teratQd that it ~i'~&ppropriate to turn to the Howey 
test 11 to 
arrangement 
determine whether a particular financial 
~ j. 
constitutes an investment contract.~~  
5-liS (emphasis added) r~, ~he Howey test to 
41n support of their contention that the Court has 
mandated use of the Howey test whenever it determines 
whether an instrument is a 11 Security, .. respondents quote 
our statement in Daniel that the Howey test 11 'embodies the 
essential attributes that run through all of the Court's 
decisions defining a security.' 11 439 u.s. 551, 558 n.ll 
(1979) (quoting Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 852 (1975)). We do 
not read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do. 
We made the statement in Forman in reference to the 
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were 
not 11 stock 11 and were not 11 investment contracts, .. at least 
they were 11 instrument[s) commonly known as a 'security"' 
within the statutory definition. We stated, as part of 
our analysis of whether the instruments were .. investment 
contracts, .. that we perceived 11 no distinction, for present 
purposes, between an 'investment contract' and an 
'instrument commonly known as a 11 Security ... , .. 421 u.s., 
Footnote continued on next page. 
24. 
traditional stock and all other types of instruments 
listed in the statutory definition would make the Acts' 
enumeration of many types of instruments superfluous. 
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See ~ · 
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s. 322, 343 (1967). 
~~, 
we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer 
of control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains 
several provisions specifically governing tender offers, 
at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the 
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was 
alleged to be a security, but only that once the label 
"stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to 
analyse the case differently whether we viewed the 
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within 
another similarly general category of the definition--an 
"instrument commonly known as a security." Under either 
of these general categories, the Howey test would apply. 
' ' 
2S. 
disclosure of transactions by corporate officers and 
principal stockholders, and the recovery of short-swing 
profits gained by such persons. See, ~., 1934 Act, §§ 
14, 16, 17 u.s.c. §§ 78n, 78p. Eliminating from the 
definition of "security" instruments involved in 
transactions where control passed to the purchaser would 
contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord Daily 
v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, S03 (CAS 1983). Furthermore, 
although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, lS u.s.c. §77d(2), exempts 
private transactions from the Act's registration 
provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the 
antifraud provisions. Thus, the structure and language of 
the Acts refute respondents' position.s 
Sin criticizing the sale of business doctrine, 
Professor Loss agrees. He considers that the doctrine 
Footnote continued on next page. 
26. 
B 
we now turn to CA9's concern that treating stock as a 
specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics means that other categories listed in the 
statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the 
same way. 
~.Lv/­
Although we do not decide whether/\ notes or 
., .. u 2 de,.. 
other instruments may be provable by their name and 
character is tics, we do point out several reasons why we }-'/...L 
~~- '-'J ~ o.LG ~ 
think stoc,k may be distinguishable from A the . other ... 
categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
"comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the 
fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions: for 
nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the 
sale of a publicly owned business for stock of the 
acquiring corporation that is distributed to the 
shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating 
dividend does not involve a security." L. Loss, 
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983) (emphasis 
in original) (footnote omitted). 
27. 
' . 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the 
usual characteristics of stock seem to us to be the 
clearest case for coverage by the plain language of the 
definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many 
people, both trained and untrained in business matters, 
the paradigm of a security." Daily v. Morgan, supra, 
~0. Thus persons trading in traditional stock likely 
have a high expectation that their activities are governed 
by the Acts. Second, as we made clear in Forman, "stock" 
is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to 
consistent definition. See p. 10, supra. Unlike some 
instruments, therefore, traditional stock is more 
susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Loss has agreed is Professor that stock ~w 
H 
different from the other categories of instrum~ :e 
. . 
28. 
observes that it "goes against the grain" to apply the 
Howey test for determining whether an instrument is an 
"investment contract" to traditional stock. L. Loss, 
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As 
Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical 
cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, 
not a security: or that not every installment 
purchase 'note' is a security; or that a person 
who charges a restaurant meal by signing his 
credit card slip is not selling a security even 
though his signature is an • evidence of 
indebtedness. • But stock (except for the r residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially a security as to foreclose further analysis." (emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 u.s. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory 
definition that were standardized enough to rest on their 
names. Id. , at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we 
29. . . 
characterized Joiner's language as dictum. 421 u.s., at 
850. As we recently suggested in a different context in 
Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, 
u.s. __ , (1984), [104 s.ct. 2979], "note" may now be 
viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses 
instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending 
on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial 
paper, or in some other investment context. See id., at 
[104 s.ct., at 2986-2988]. We here expressly leave 
'-------
until another day the question whether "notes" or "bonds" 
or some other category of instrument listed in the 
definition might be shown "by proving [only] the document 
itself." SEC v. C.M Joiner Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. 
We hold only that "stock" may be viewed as being in a 
30. 
category by itself for purposes of interpreting the scope 
of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not 
employing the sale of business doctrine under the 
circumstances of this case. By respondents' own 
admission, application of the doctrine depends in each 
case on whether control has passed to the purchaser. 
Under the doctrine, the Acts' coverage would have to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, depending in part on 
the percentage of stock transferred, the number of 
purchasers, and what provisions for voting and veto rights 
were also agreed upon by the parties. Thus, coverage by 
the Acts would i~e be uncertain: it is possible 
that under some circumstances the same stock could be 
31. 
deemed to be "securities" as to some purchasers, but not 
as to others, or as to the sellers, but not the buyers. 
We believe these uncertainties attending the applicability 
of the Acts would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. 
Weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) (rejecting the 
argument that the certificate of deposit at issue there 
was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it 
was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting 
petitioner's approach will increase the workload of the 
federal courts by converting state and common law fraud 
w 
claims into federal clad ~e find "t."h more daunting, 
however, the prospect that parties to a transaction may 
never know for J.otHe whether they are covered by the Acts 
~1--e-~ 
until they engage in e~&es d1scovery and litigation over 
"' 
a concept~ ~s elusive as the passage of control. 6 
Footnote(s) 6 will appear on following pages. 
32. 
Accord Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146 (CA2 
1982) • 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a 
"security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
is therefore 
6It might be argued that this case, involving the 
transfer of 100% of the corporation's stock, is an easy 
one in which to discern whether control has passed. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question under 
the circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had 
no intention of running the sawmill themselves and Ivan 
Landreth apparently stayed on to manage the daily affairs 
of the business. The District Court CQ£tai~1¥ was -t; 
required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even 
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of 
control, before it was able to decide the case. Petn App. 
13a. If this degree of uncertainty attends this case, how 
much greater the unpredictability would be in a case such 
as Gould v. Ruefenacht, ___ u.s. ___ (1985), decided today 
as a companion to the case at bar, involving the sale of 




LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER, v. IVAN K. LANDRETH, 
et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
[April __ , 1985) 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all 
of the stock of a company is a securities transaction 
2. 
subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws (the Acts). 
I 
"fh-is action arises out of the sale by' i_espondents Ivan 
~ 
K. Landreth and his sons ~ all of the outstanding stock 
of a -G loaely ::!'xJ- lumber b~:::J e- they mtned:L-a n~ate<Y-
in Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered 
their stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-
state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the 
company's sawmill was heavily damaged by fire. Despite 
the fire, the brokers continued to offer the stock for 
p ~cJ ~~' ~ """;~ o t ha J~"Y", .t...J .f-eU 




Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for salee!J and makiR'i:J eereaiR 51 
(, , C ~ (;tt., 'J c.--.ur,...·~ 0 .L.o C.\•J 0 ' ~ " 1"'- representations as t e'- e extent of the rebuilding plans, 
the predicted productivity of the mill, existing 
~ 
contracts, and expected profits , Dennis W'&& interested 
/-(. 
~ talked to John Bolten, a former client who had retired 
to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill 
conducted, Dennis agreed to purchase all of the common 
stock in the lumber company . ~Ivan Landreth agreed to 
stay on as a consultant for some time to help with the 
daily operations of the mill. Dennis assigned the stock 
c..~ f.,. Jn ,_ 
to B & D Company, a comp~RY formed for the sole purpose of 
acquiring the lumber company stock. B & D then merged 
with the lumber company, forming petitioner Landreth 
4. 
Timber Company. Dennis and Bolten owned all of 
petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of the 
equity, and six other investors together owned the Class B 
stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not 
live up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs 
exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out 
to be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, 
petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into 
receivership. Petitioner then filed this suit seeking 
rescission of the sale of stock and $2,500,000 in damage sG) 
alleg f~ that respondents had~ and then sold 
their stock without registering it as required by the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 u.s.c. §77a, et seq., (the 1933 
Act). Petitionerj also alleged that respondents had 
5. 
i 
negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and 
had failed to state material facts as to the worth and 
prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c. §78a, et seq. 
(the 1934 Act) • 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, 
petitioner had not purchased a "security" within the 
meaning of those Acts. The District Court granted 
respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want 
of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal 
statutes include "stock" as one of the instruments 
constituting a "security," and that the stock at issue 
possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
6. 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the 
"growing majority" of courts that had held that the 
federal securities laws do not apply to the sale of 100% 
of the stock of a closely held corporation. Petn App. 
13a. Relying on United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 
u.s. 837 (1975), and SEC v. w.J. Howey Co., 328 u.s. 293 
(1946), the District Court ruled that the stock could not 
be considered a "security" unless the purchaser had 
entered into the transaction with the anticipation of 
earning profits derived from the efforts of others. 
Finding that managerial control of the business had passed 
into the hands of the purchasers, and thus, that the 
transaction was a commercial venture rather than a typical 




The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the District Court's application ·of the 
13\ f."2ol nva (Jct8'1). 
sale of business doctrine. ~ It agreed that it was bound by 
~I 
Forman J and Howey, supra, to determine in . every case 
whether the economic realities of the transaction 
indicated that the Acts applied. . Because the Courts of 
Appeals are divided over the applicability of the federal 
securities laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 
100% of its stock, we granted certiorari. u.s. 
(1984). We now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every 
case involving construction of a statute is the language 
itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 
723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J 0 ' concurring); accord 
8. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 u.s. 
551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 u.s.c. 
§77b(l), defines a "security" as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, 
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in 
general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of 
interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee 
of, or warrant or right to ~ubscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing." 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 556 (1982), 
1we have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of 
"security" in §3(a) (10) of the 1934 Act and §2(1) of the 
1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as 
such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 847 
n.l2 (1975). 
9. 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry 
well-settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more 
variable character [that] were necessarily designated by 
more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and 
"instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" SEC v. c. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344, 351 (1943). The face 
of the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a 
"security" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed 
in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title 
are likely to be covered by the definition. !d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that 
instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself 
sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we 
concluded that we must also determine whether those 
10. 
instruments possess "some of the significant 
characteristics typically associated with" stock, id., at 
851, recognizing that when an instrument is both called 
"stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, "a 
purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal 
securities laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those 
character is tics usually associated with stock as ( i) the 
right to receive dividends contingent upon an 
apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the 
ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (iv) the ability to 
confer voting rights in proportion to the number of shares 
owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. Id. ,J- 8Sj 
--) . 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the 
instruments at issue there were not "securities" within 
the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of 
11. 
shares of stock entitling the purchaser to lease an 
apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none 
of the characteristics listed above that are usually 
associated with traditional stock. Moreover, we concluded 
that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that 
the purchasers had been misled by use of the word "stock" 
into thinking that the federal securities laws governed 
their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire 
low-cost subsidized living space for their personal use; 
no one was likely to have believed that he was purchasing 
investment securities. ~ 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved 
here possesses all of the characteristics we identified in 
Forman as traditionally associated with stock. Indeed, 
the District Court so found. Petn App. 13a. Moreover, 
12. 
unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved 
here--the sale of stock in a corporation--is typical of 
the context to which the Acts normally apply. It is thus 
much more likely here than in Forman that an investor 
would believe he was covered by the federal securities 
laws. Under the circumstances of this case, the plain 
meaning of the statutory definition mandates that the 
stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage 
of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of 
stock at issue here comports with Congress's remedial 
purpose in enacting the legislation to protect investors 
by "compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the 
issuance of 'the many types of instruments that in our 
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a 
13. 
security." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 
(1946) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 
(1933)). Although we recognize that Congress did not 
intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud, 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 556 (1982), we think 
it would improperly narrow Congress's broad definition of 
"security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue 
here falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the 
statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient 
answer compelling judgment for petitioner f . 2 
2Professor Loss suggests that the statutory 
sufficient. L. Loss, Fundamentals of 






urge, however, that language in our previous opinions, 
including Forman, requires that we look beyond the label 
"stock" and the character is tics of the instruments 
involved to determine whether application of the Acts is 
mandated by the economic substance of the transaction. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the 
plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to 
hold this stock covered, because it saw "no principled 
way" to justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the 
definitional categories differently. We address these 
concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely 
clear on the proper method of analysis for determining 
when an instrument is a "security." This Court has 
15. 
decided a number of cases in which it looked to the 
economic substance of the transaction, rather than just to 
its form, to determine whether the Acts applied. In SEC 
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344 (1943), for 
example, the Court considered whether the 1933 Act applied 
to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a proposed 
oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold 
interests were "securities," the Court noted that "the 
reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and 
1! · J ~>(. 
commonplace." [~ather, it ruled that unusual devices such 
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved 
as matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt 
in under terms or courses of dealing which established 
their character in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or 
16. 
as 'any interest or instrument commonly known as a 
'security.'" ~
SEC v. w.J. Howey Co. I 328 u.s. 293 (1946) I further 
elucidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual 
instrument could be considered a "security" if the 
circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in 
that case was an offering of units of a citrus grove 
development coupled with a contract for cultivating and 
marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the 
investors. The Court held that the offering constituted 
an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 1933 
Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[d] an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of 
others." Id., at 301. 
I: 
17. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the 
second part of our decision in Forman, on which 
respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part 
II, supra, the first part of our decision in Forman 
concluded that the instruments at issue, while they bore 
the traditional label "stock," were not "securities" 
because they possessed none of the usual character is tics 
of stock. We then went on to address the argument that 
the instruments were "investment contracts." Applying the 
Howey test, we concluded that the instruments likewise 
were not "securities" by virtue of being "investment 
contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with 
their money not for the purpose of reaping profits from 
k ' 
18. 
the efforts of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a 
commodity for personal consumption. 421 u.s., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 3 require us to reject the view that the 
shares of stock at issue here may be considered 
"securities" because of their name and characteristics. 
Instead, they argue that our cases require us in every 
3Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 
u.s. 332 (1967), and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551 
(1982) , as support for their argument that we have 
mandated in every case a determination of whether the 
economic realities of a transaction call for the 
application of the Acts. It is sufficient to note here 
that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did 
not fit squarely within one of the enumerated specific 
kinds of securities listed in the definition. See pp. 19-
23, infra. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital 
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver 
involved a certificate of deposit and a privately 
negotiated profit sharing agreement. See 455 u.s. 551, at 
557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of 
deposit involved in Weaver did not fit within the 
definition's category "certificate of deposit, for a 
security." 
19. 
case to look to the economic substance of the transaction 
to determine whether the Howey test has been met. 
According to respondents, it is clear that petitioner 
sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but 
to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to "use or consume" the bu~iness purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, 
respondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our 
cases. First, it is important to understand the contexts 
within which these cases were decided. All of the cases 
on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not 
20. 
easily characterized as "securities." Thus, if the Acts 
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have 
been because the economic reality underlying the 
transaction indicated that the instrument was actually of 
a type that falls within the usual concept of a security. 
In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument involved 
is traditional stock, plainly within the statutory 
definition. There is no need here, as there was in the 
prior cases, to look beyond the character is tics of the 
instrument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has 
never foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found 
to be a "security" simply because it is what it purports 
to be. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344 
(1943) , the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words 
21. 
of the Act; we merely accept them • ••• In some cases, 
/\ 
[proving that the documents were securities) might be done 
by proving the document itself, which on its face would be 
a note, a bond, or a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor 
does Forman require a different result. Respondents are 
correct that in Forman we eschewed a "literal" approach 
that would invoke the Acts' coverage simply because the 
instrument carried the label "stock." Forman does not, 
however, eliminate the Court's ability to hold that an 
instrument is covered when its character is tics bear out 
the label. See pp. 9-10, supra. 
Second, we would note that the Howey test was designed 
to determine whether a particular instrument is an 
"investment contract," not whether it fits within ~ of 
the examples listed in the statutory definition of 
22. 
"security." . . h th. . 4 Our cases are cons1stent w1t 1s v1ew. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 u.s. 
551, 558 ( 1979) (appropriate to turn to the Howey test •G o 
determine whether a particular financial arrangement 
4In support of their contention that the Court has 
mandated use of the Howey test whenever it determines 
whether an instrument is a "security," respondents quote 
our statement in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
Daniel that the Howey test "'embodies the essential 
attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions 
defining a security.'" 439 u.s. 551, 558 n.ll (1979) 
(quoting Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 852 (1975)). We do not 
read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do. We 
made the statement in Forman in reference to the 
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were 
not "stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least 
they were "instrument [s] commonly known as a 'security'" 
within the statutory definition. We stated, as part of 
our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment 
contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present 
purposes, between an 'investment contract • and an 
'instrument commonly known as a "security.'"" 421 u.s., 
at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the 
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was 
alleged to be a security, but only that once the label 
"stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to 
analyse the case differently whether we viewed the 
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within 
another similarly general category of the definition--an 
"instrument commonly known as a security." Under either 
of these general categories, the Howey test would apply. 
23. 
constitutes an investment contract."): United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, supra: see p. 17, supra. Moreover, 
applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other 
types of instruments listed in the statutory definition 
would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of 
instruments superfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 
1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s. 
) 
3/ 2, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer 
of control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains 
several provisions specifically governing tender offers, 
disclosure of transactions by corporate officers and 
principal stockholders, and the recovery of short-swing 
24. 
profits gained by such persons. See, ~., 1934 Act, §§ 
I ,., 
14, 16, lf u.s.c. §§ 78n, 78p. Eliminating from the 
definition of "security" instruments involved in 
transactions where control passed to the purchaser would 
contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord Daily 
v. Morgan, 701 F.2d 496, S03 (CAS 1983). Furthermore, 
although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, lS u.s.c. §77d(2), exempts 
private transactions from the Act's registration 
provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the 
antifraud provisions. Thus, the structure and language of 
the Acts refute respondents' position.s 
Sin criticizing the sale of business doctrine, 
Professor Loss agrees. He considers that the doctrine 
"comes dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the 
fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for 
nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the 
sale of a publicly owned business for stock of the 
acquiring corporation that is distributed to the 
shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating 
Footnote continued on next page. 
25. 
B 
We now turn to CA9's concern that treating stock as a 
specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics means that other categories listed in the 
statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the 
same way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of 
notes or other instruments may be provable by their name 
and characteristics, we do point out several reasons why 
we think stock may be distinguishable from most if not all 
of the other categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the 
usual characteristics of stock seem to us to be the 
dividend does not involve a security." 
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983) 




clearest case for coverage by the plain language of the 
definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many 
people, both trained and untrained in business matters, 
the paradigm of a security." Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 
500. Thus persons trading in traditional stock likely 
have a high expectation that their activities are governed 
by the Acts. Second, as we made clear in Forman, "stock" 
is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to 
consistent definition. Seep. 10, supra. Unlike some 
instruments, therefore, traditional stock is more 
susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from 
the other categories of instruments. He observes that it 
"goes against the grain" to apply the Howey test for 
determining whether an instrument is an "investment 
27. 
contract" to traditional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of 
Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983) • As Professor Loss 
explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical 
cooperative apartment dweller has bought a home, 
not a security; or that not every installment 
purchase 'note' is a security; or that a person 
who charges a restaurant meal by signing his 
credit card slip is not selling a security even 
though his signature is an 'evidence of 
indebtedness. ' But stock (except for the 
residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially a 
secu_r..ili a to foreclose further analysis." 
< emphas_is in origi~ 
at 212."/? 
we recognize that in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 u.s. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory 
definition that were standardized enough to rest on their 
names. Id., at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we 
characterized Joiner's language as dictum. 421 u.s., at 
850. As we recently suggested in a different context in 
28. 
Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, 
u.s. __ , (1984), [104 s.ct. 2979), "note" may now be 
viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses 
instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending 
on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial 
paper, or in some other investment context. See id., at 
[104 s.ct., at 2986-2988). We here expressly leave 
until another day the question whether "notes" or "bonds" 
or some other category of instrument listed in the 
definition might be shown "by proving [only) the document 
itself." SEC v. C.M Joiner Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. 
We hold only that "stock" may be viewed as being in a 
category by itself for purposes of interpreting the scope 




We also perceive strong policy reasons for not 
employing the sale of business doctrine under the 
circumstances of this case. By respondents' own 
admission, application of the doctrine depends in each 
on whether control has passed to the purchaser. ) 
"""" ~ c.~ 
-h•ve te 13e 
aeeermined on a case by ca~e basjs, depend~ in part on 
the percentage of stock transferred, the number of 
urchasers, and what provisions for voting and veto 
were also agreed upon by the 
\.~~~~ 
the Acts would ~~certaiflJ 
~~~ 
it is possjhle that und.er 
seme cit cams Lances the same stock coul9 be <3eemed to .be 
"se.c..nrities" as to some purchasers, aut not as to others, 
~~c--, 
sr as to the Sellers, but not the buyers. E hel ieve_ 
these uncertainties attending the applicability of the 
30. 
Acts would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
u.s. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) (rejecting the argument that the 
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, 
chameleon-like, into a .. security .. once it was pledged) •1 
Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will 
increase the workload of the federal courts by converting 
state and common law fraud claims into federal claims. We 
find more daunting, however, the prospect that parties to 
a transaction may never know whether they are covered by 
the Acts until they engage in extended discovery and 
litigation over a concept as often elusive as the passage 
of contro1. 6 Accord Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 
6 I.t might: he argued that this case, involving the 
~00% of the cor!3oration' s stoek, is an easy 
orre-i-n-wh-i:ch to diseern whether control has passed. L we 
think even that assertion is open to some question under 
the circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had 
Footnote continued on next page. 
31. 
1145-1146 (CA2 1982) • 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a 
"security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
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no intention of nning the sawmill themselves and Iva 
Landreth apparent stayed on to manage the daily affa' s 
of the business. 1he District Court was require to 
undertake extensive fact-finding, and ~ re ested 
supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of ontrol, 
before it was able to decide the case. j Petn App 13a~ If 
this degree of uncertainty attends this cas , how much 
greater the unpredictability would be in a case such as 
Gould v. Ruefenacht, u.s. (1985), cided today as _9-.. 
a companion to the case at bar, involvin the sale of 50% 
of a corporation's stock. 
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LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER, v. IVAN K. LANDRETH, 
et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
ts -r ~ kt"«-bets DVYL() r 
[April __ , 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court: 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all 
of the stock of a company is a securities transaction 
2. 
subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws (the Acts). 
I 
Respondents Ivan K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated 
in Tonasket, washington. The Landreth family offered 
their stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-
state brokers. Before a purchaser was found, the 
company's sawmill was heavily damaged by fire. Despite 
the fire, the brokers continued to offer the stock for 
sale. Potential purchasers were advised of the damage, 
but were told that the mill would be completely rebuilt 
and modernized. 
3. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the 
letter's representations concerning the rebuilding plans, 
the predicted productivity of the mill, existing 
contracts, and expected profits, Dennis became interested 
in acquiring the stock. He talked to John Bolten, a 
former client who had retired to Florida, about joining 
him in investigating the offer. After having an audit and 
an inspection of the mill conducted, Dennis agreed to 
purchase all of the common stock in the lumber company. 
Ivan Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some 
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. 
Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a corporation 
formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber 
company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, 
4. 
forming petitioner Landreth Timber Company. Dennis and 
Bolten owned all of petitioner's Class A stock, 
representing 85% of the equity, and six other investors 
together owned the Class B stock, representing the 
remaining 15% of the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not 
live up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs 
exceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out 
to be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, 
petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into 
receivership. Petitioner then filed this suit seeking 
rescission of the sale of stock and $2,500,000 in damages, 
alleging that respondents had widely offered and then sold 
their stock without registering it as required by the 
Securities Act of 1933, 15 u.s.c. §77a, et seq., (the 1933 
5. 
Act). Petitioner also alleged that respondents had 
negligently or intentionally made misrepresentations and 
had failed to state material facts as to the worth and 
prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 u.s.c. §78a, et seq. 
( the 19 3 4 Act ) . 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, 
petitioner had not purchased a "security" within the 
meaning of those Acts. The District Court granted 
respondents' motion and dismissed the complaint for want 
of federal jurisdiction. It acknowledged that the federal 
statutes include "stock" as one of the instruments 
constituting a "security," and that the stock at issue 
6. 
possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the 
"growing majority" of courts that had held that the 
federal securities laws do not apply to the sale of 100% 
of the stock of a closely held corporation. Petn App. 
13a. Relying on United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 
u.s. 837 (1975), and SEC v. w.J. Howey co., 328 u.s. 293 
(1946), the District Court ruled that the stock could not 
be considered a "security" unless the purchaser had 
entered into the transaction with the anticipation of 
earning profits derived from the efforts of others. 
Finding that managerial control of the business had passed 
into the hands of the purchasers, and thus, that the 
transaction was a commercial venture rather than a typical 




The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed the District Court's application of the 
sale of business doctrine. 731 F.2d 1348 (1984}. It 
agreed that it was bound by United Housing Foundation v. 
Forman, supra, and SEC v. w.J. Howey Co., supra, to 
determine in every case whether the economic realities of 
the transaction indicated that the Acts applied. Because 
the Courts of Appeals are divided over the applicability 
of the federal securities laws when a business is sold by 
the transfer of 100% of its stock, we granted certiorari. 
u.s. (1984}. We now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every 
case involving construction of a statute is the language 
itself." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 
8. 
723, 756 (1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 u.s. 
551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 u.s.c. 
§77b(l), defines a "security" as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, 
debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate 
of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, 
preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-
trust certificate, certificate of deposit for a 
security, fractional undivided interest in oil, 
gas, or other mineral rights, or, in 
general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of 
interest or participation in, temporary or 
interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee 
of, or warrant or right to ~ubscribe to or 
purchase, any of the foregoing." 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry 
well-settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more 
variable character [that] were necessarily designated by 
more descriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and 
9. 
"instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" SEC v. c. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344, 351 (1943). The face 
of the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a 
"security" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed 
in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title 
are likely to be covered by the definition. Id., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that 
instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself 
sufficient to invoke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we 
concluded that we must also determine whether those 
instruments possess "some of the significant 
character is tics typically associated with" stock, id., at 
851, recognizing that when an instrument is both called 
"stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, "a 
10. 
purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal 
securities laws apply, .. id., at 850. We identified those 
characteristics usually associated with stock as ( i) the 
right to receive dividends contingent upon an 
apportionment of profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the 
ability to be pledged or hypothecated; (iv) the ability to 
confer voting rights in proportion to the number of shares 
owned; and (v) the capacity to appreciate in value. Id., 
at 851. 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the 
instruments at issue there were not .. securities.. within 
the meaning of the Acts. That case involved the sale of 
shares of stock entitling the purchaser to lease an 
apartment in a housing cooperative. The stock bore none 
of the characteristics listed above that are usually 
11. 
associated with traditional stock. Moreover, we concluded 
that under the circumstances, there was no likelihood that 
the purchasers had been misled by use of the word "stock" 
into thinking that the federal securities laws governed 
their purchases. The purchasers had intended to acquire 
low-cost subsidized living space for their personal use: 
no one was likely to have believed that he was purchasing 
investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved 
here possesses all of the characteristics we identified in 
Forman as traditionally associated with stock. Indeed, 
the District Court so found. Petn App. 13a. Moreover, 
unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction involved 
here--the sale of stock in a corporation--is typical of 
the context to which the Acts normally apply. It is thus 
12. 
much more likely here than in Forman that an investor 
would believe he was covered by the federal securities 
laws. Under the circumstances of this case, the plain 
meaning of the statutory definition mandates that the 
stock be treated as "securities" subject to the coverage 
of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of 
stock at issue here comports with Congress's remedial 
purpose in enacting the legislation to protect investors 
by "compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the 
issuance of 'the many types of instruments that in our 
commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a 
security." SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 
(1946) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 
(1933)) 0 Although we recognize that Congress did not 
13. 
intend to provide a broad federal remedy for all fraud, 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 556 (1982), we think 
it would improperly narrow Congress's broad definition of 
"security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue 
here falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the 
statutory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient 
answer compelling judgment for petitioner. 2 Respondents 
urge, however, that language in our previous opinions, 
including Forman, requires that we look beyond the label 
"stock" and the character is tics of the instruments 
involved to determine whether application of the Acts is 
mandated by the economic substance of the transaction. 
Moreover, the Court of Appeals rejected the view that the 
14. 
plain meaning of the definition would be sufficient to 
hold this stock covered, because it saw "no principled 
way" to justify treating notes, bonds, and other of the 
definitional categories differently. We address these 
concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely 
clear on the proper method of analysis for determining 
when an instrument is a "security." This Court has 
decided a number of cases in which it looked to the 
economic substance of the transaction, rather than just to 
its form, to determine whether the Acts applied. In SEC 
v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344 (1943), for 
example, the Court considered whether the 1933 Act applied 
to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a proposed 
15. 
oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold 
interests were "securities," the Court noted that "the 
reach of the Act does not stop with the obvious and 
commonplace." Id., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual 
devices such as the leaseholds would also be covered "if 
it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely 
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing 
which established their character in commerce as 
'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a 'security.'" Ibid. --
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946), further 
elucidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual 
instrument could be considered a "security" if the 
circumstances of the transaction so dictated. At issue in 
that case was an offering of units of a citrus grove 
16. 
development coupled with a contract for cultivating and 
marketing the fruit and remitting the proceeds to the 
investors. The Court held that the offering constituted 
an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 1933 
Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[d] an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of 
others." !d., at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the 
second part of our decision in Forman, on which 
respondents primarily rely. As discussed above, see Part 
II, supra, the first part of our decision in Forman 
concluded that the instruments at issue, while they bore 
the traditional label "stock," were not "securities" 
because they possessed none of the usual character is tics 
17. 
of stock. We then went on to address the argument that 
the instruments were "investment contracts." Applying the 
Howey test, we concluded that the instruments likewise 
were not "securities" by virtue of being "investment 
contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with 
their money not for the purpose of reaping profits from 
the efforts of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a 
commodity for personal consumption. 421 u.s., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 3 require us to reject the view that the 
shares of stock at issue here may be considered 
"securities" because of their name and characteristics. 
Instead, they argue that our cases require us in every 
case to look to the economic substance of the transaction 
18. 
to determine whether the Howey test has been met. 
According to respondents, it is clear that petitioner 
sought not to earn profits from the efforts of others, but 
to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to nuse or consumen the business purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, 
respondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our 
cases. First, it is important to understand the contexts 
within which these cases were decided. All of the cases 
on which respondents rely involved unusual instruments not 
easily characterized as nsecurities.n Thus, if the Acts 
19. 
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have 
been because the economic reality underlying the 
transaction indicated that the instrument was actually of 
a type that falls within the usual concept of a security. 
In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument involved 
is tradi tiona! stock, plainly within the statutory 
definition. There is no need here, as there was in the 
prior cases, to look beyond the character is tics of the 
instrument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has 
never foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found 
to be a "security" simply because it is what it purports 
to be. In SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 u.s. 344 
(1943) , the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words 
of the Act; we merely accept them. In some cases, 
20. 
[proving that the documents were securities] might be done 
by proving the document itself, which on its face would be 
a note, a bond, or a share of stock." Id., at 355. Nor 
does Forman require a different result. Respondents are 
correct that in Forman we eschewed a "literal" approach 
that would invoke the Acts 1 coverage simply because the 
instrument carried the label "stock." Forman does not, 
however, eliminate the Court 1 s ability to hold that an 
instrument is covered when its characteristics bear out 
the label. See pp. 9-10, supra. 
Second, we would note that the Howey test was designed 
to determine whether a particular instrument is an 
"investment contract," not whether it fits within ~ of 
the examples listed in the statutory definition of 
"security." Our cases are consistent with this view. 4 
21. 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 u.s. 
551, 558 (1979) (appropriate to turn to the Howey test to 
"determine whether a particular financial arrangement 
constitutes an investment contract."); United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, supra; see p. 17, supra. Moreover, 
applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other 
types of instruments listed in the statutory definition 
would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of 
instruments superfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 
1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s. 
332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer 
of control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains 
22. 
several provisions specifically governing tender offers, 
disclosure of transactions by corporate officers and 
principal stockholders, and the recovery of short-swing 
profits gained by such persons. See, ~·r 1934 Act, §§ 
14, 16, 15 u.s.c. §§ 78n, 78p. Eliminating from the 
definition of "security" instruments involved in 
transactions where control passed to the purchaser would 
contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord Daily 
v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CAS 1983) • Furthermore, 
although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 u.s.c. §77d(2), exempts 
private transactions from the Act's registration 
provisions, there is no comparable exemption from the 
antifraud provisions. Thus, the structure and language of 
the Acts refute respondents' position. 5 
B 
23. 
We now turn to CA9's concern that treating stock as a 
specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics means that other categories listed in the 
statutory definition, such as notes, must be treated the 
same way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of 
notes or other instruments may be provable by their name 
and characteristics, we do point out several reasons why 
we think stock may be distinguishable from most if not all 
of the other categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the 
usual characteristics of stock seem to us to be the 
clearest case for coverage by the plain language of the 
definition. First, traditional stock "represents to many 
people, both trained and untrained in business matters, 
the paradigm of a security." Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 
24. 
500. Thus persons trading in traditional stock likely 
have a high expectation that their activities are governed 
by the Acts. Second, as we made clear in Forman, "stock" 
is relatively easy to identify because it lends itself to 
consistent definition. See p. 10, supra. Unlike some 
instruments, therefore, traditional stock is more 
susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from 
the other categories of instruments. He observes that it 
"goes against the grain" to apply the Howey test for 
determining whether an instrument is an "investment 
contract" to traditional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of 
Securities Regulation 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss 
explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical 
cooperative apartment dweller has bought a horne, 
not a security: or that not every installment 
purchase 'note' is a security: or that a person 
who charges a restaurant meal by signing his 
credit card slip is not selling a security even 
though his signature is an 'evidence of 
indebtedness. ' But stock (except for the 
residential wrinkle} is so quintessentially a 
security as to foreclose further analysis." 
Id., at 212 (emphasis in original}. 
25. 
We recognize that in SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 u.s. 344 (1943}, the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory 
definition that were standardized enough to rest on their 
names. Id. , at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we 
characterized Joiner's language as dictum. 421 u.s., at 
850. As we recently suggested in a different context in 
Securities Industry Association v. Board of Governors, 
u.s. __ , (1984}, [104 s.ct. 2979], "note" may now be 
viewed as a relatively broad term that encompasses 
instruments with widely varying characteristics, depending 
26. 
on whether issued in a consumer context, as commercial 
paper, or in some other investment context. See id., at 
__ [104 s.ct., at 2986-2988]. We here expressly leave 
until another day the question whether "notes" or "bonds" 
or some other category of instrument listed in the 
definition might be shown "by proving [only] the document 
itself." SEC v. C.M Joiner Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. 
We hold only that "stock" may be viewed as being in a 
category by itself for purposes of interpreting the scope 
of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not 
employing the sale of business doctrine under the 
circumstances of this case. By respondents' own 
admission, application of the doctrine depends in each 
27. 
case on whether control has passed to the purchaser. 
Under the doctrine, the Acts' coverage would have to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, depending in part on 
the percentage of stock transferred, the number of 
purchasers, and what provisions for voting and veto rights 
were also agreed upon by the par ties. Thus, coverage by 
the Acts would in most cases be uncertain; it is possible 
that under some circumstances the same stock could be 
deemed to be "securities" as to some purchasers, but not 
as to others, or as to the sellers, but not the buyers. 
We believe these uncertainties attending the applicability 
of the Acts would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. 
weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) (rejecting the 
argument that the certificate of deposit at issue there 
was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it 
28. 
was pledged} . Respondents argue that adopting 
petitioner's approach will increase the workload of the 
federal courts by converting state and common law fraud 
claims into federal claims. We find more daunting, 
however, the prospect that parties to a transaction may 
never know whether they are covered by the Acts until they 
engage in extended discovery and litigation over a concept 
as often elusive as the passage of contro1. 6 Accord Golden 
v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1145-1146 {CA2 1982}. 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a 
"security" within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
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1we have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of 
"security" in §3 (a) (10) of the 1934 Act and §2 (1) of the 
1933 Act are virtually identical and will be treated as 
such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982): 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 847 
n.l2 (1975). 
2Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is 
sufficient. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities 
Regulation 212 (1983). See pp. 26-27, infra. 
3Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 u.s. 
332 (1967), and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 u.s. 551 
(1982) , as support for their argument that we have 
mandated in every case a determination of whether the 
economic realities of a transaction call for the 
application of the Acts. It is sufficient to note here 
that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did 
not fit squarely within one of the enumerated specific 
kinds of securities listed in the definition. See pp. 19-
23, infra. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital 
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver 
involved a certificate of deposit and a privately 
negotiated profit sharing agreement. See 455 u.s. 551, at 
557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of 
deposit involved in Weaver did not fit within the 
definition's category "certificate of deposit, for a 
security." 
4In support of their contention that the Court has 
mandated use of the Howey test whenever it determines 
whether an instrument is a "security," respondents quote 
our statement in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. 
Daniel that the Howey test "'embodies the essential 
attributes that run through all of the Court's decisions 
defining a security.'" 439 u.s. 551, 558 n.ll (1979) 
(quoting Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 852 (1975)). We do not 
read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do. We 
made the statement in Forman in reference to the 
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were 
not "stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least 
they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'" 
within the statutory definition. We stated, as part of 
our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment 
contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present 
purposes, between an 'investment contract' and an 
'instrument commonly known as a "security.""' 421 u.s., 
at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the 
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was 
alleged to be a security, but only that once the label 
"stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to 
analyse the case differently whether we viewed the 
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within 
another similarly general category of the definition--an 
"instrument commonly known as a security." Under either 
of these general categories, the Howey test would apply. 
5 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor 
Loss agrees. He considers that the doctrine "comes 
dangerously close to the heresy of saying that the fraud 
prov1s1ons do not apply to private transactions: for 
nobody, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the 
sale of a publicly owned business for stock of the 
acqu1r1ng corporation that is distributed to the 
shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating 
dividend does not involve a security." L. Loss, 
Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 ( 1983) (emphasis 
in original) (footnote omitted). 
6It might be argued that this case, involving the 
transfer of 100% of the corporation's stock, is an easy 
one in which to discern whether control has passed. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question under 
the circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had 
no intention of running the sawmill themselves and Ivan 
Landreth apparently stayed on to manage the daily affairs 
of the business. The District Court was required to 
undertake extensive fact-finding, and even requested 
supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of control, 
before it was able to decide the case. Petn App. 13a. If 
this degree of uncertainty attends this case, how much 
greater the unpredictability would be in a case such as 
Gould v. Ruefenacht, ___ u.s. ___ (1985), decided today as 
a companion to the case at bar, involving the sale of 50% 
of a corporation's stock. 
,, 
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It may be argued that on the facts of this case, the 
doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% of 
a corporation's stock presumptively transfers control. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question, 
however, as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running 
the sawmill themselves. Ivan Landreth apparently stayed 
§;cwUL-
on to manage the daily affairs of the business. At least 
~ commentato~who support;r:he sale of business doctrine 
believer that a purchaser who has the ability to exert 
control but chooses not to do so may deserve the Acts' 
protection if he is just a passive investor not engaged in 
the daily management of the business. Easley, Recent 
Developments in the Sale-of-Bu Doctrine, 
___ ,....39 
Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 (1984)) In this case, the District 
Court was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, 
and even requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the 
issue of control before it was able to decide the case. 
App. to 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the 
sale of business doctrine would also have to be applied to 
cases in which less than 100% of a company 1 s stock was 
sold. This would inevitably lead to difficult questions 
of line-drawing. The Acts 1 coverage would in every case 
depend not only on the percentage of stock transferred, 
but also such factors as the number of purchasers and what 
provisions for voting and veto rights were agreed upon by 
the parties. As we explain more fully in Gould v. 
3. 
Ruefenacht, u.s. __ , (1985), decided today as a 
companion to this case, coverage by the Acts would in most 
cases be unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time 
the stock was sold. 
La:iiZ/r~ 7!~ v., ~ 
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~JUSTICE STEVENS dissents on the ground that Congress did 
not intend the antifraud provisions of the federal 
securities laws to apply to "the private sale of a 
substantial ownership interest in [a business) simply 
because the transaction [) w [as) structured as [a) sale [) 
of stock instead of assets." Post, at 4. JUSTICE 
STEVENS, of course, is correct in saying that it is clear 
from the legislative history of the Securities Acts of 
1933 and 1934 that Congress was concerned primarily with 
transactions "in securities traded in a public 
market." United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 
u.s. 837, 849 (1975). It also is true that there is no 
indication in the legislative history that Congress 
.. 
considered the type of transactions involved in this case 
and in Gould v. Ruefenacht, infra. 
~{ The history is simply silent--as it is with respect to 
other transactions to which these Acts have been applied 
by the Commission and judicial interpretation over the 
half century since this legislation was adopted. One only 
need mention the expansive interpretation of §lO(b) of the 
1934 Act and Rule lOb-S adopted by the Commission. What 
the Court said in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 
421 u.s. 723 (197S), is relevant: 
"When we deal with private actions under Rule 
lOb-S, we deal with a judicial oak which has 
grown from little more than a legislative acorn. 
Such growth may be quite consistent with the 
congressional enactment and with the role of the 
federal judiciary in interpreting it, see J. I. 
Case Co. v Borak, [377 u.s. 426 (1964)), but it 
would be disingenuous to suggest that either 
Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in 1942 foreordained the present 
state of the law with respect to Rule lOb-5. It 
is therefore proper that we consider, in 
addition to the factors already discussed, what 
may be described as policy considerations when 
we come to flesh out the portions of the law 
with respect to which neither the congressional 
enactment nor the administrative regulations 
offer conclusive guidance." Id., at 737. 
See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 u.s. 185, 196-
197 (1976). 
In this case, unlike with respect to the interpretation 
of §10 (b) in Blue Chip Stamps, we have the plain language 
of §2(1) of the 1933 Act in support of our interpretation. 
In Forman, supra, we recognized that the term "stock" is 
to be read in accordance with the common understanding of 
its meaning, including the characteristics identified in 
Forman. See supra, at 4-5. In addition, as stated in 
Blue Chip Stamps, supra, it is proper for a court to 
consider--as we do today--policy considerations in 
construing terms in these Acts. 
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Justice Stevens dissents on the ground that 
Congress did not intend the antifraud provisions of the 
federal security laws to apply to "the private sale of a 
substantial ownership interest in a business where the 
transactions is a sale of stock rather than of assets". 
Justice Stevens, of course, is correct in saying that it 
is clear from the legislative history of the Securities 
Acts of 1933 and 1934 that Congress was concerned 
primarily with transactions "in securities ••• traded in 
a public market". See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 849 (1975). It also is true that 
there is no indication in the legislative history that 
2. 
Congress considered the type of transactions involved in 
this case and in Gould v. Ruefenacht, infra. 
The history is simply silent - as it is with 
respect to other transactions to which these Acts have 
been applied by the Commission and judicial interpretation 
over the half century since this legislation was adopted. 
One only need mention the expansive interpretation of 
§lO(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 adopted by the 
Commission. What the Court said in Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723 (1975) is relevant: 
"When we deal with private actions under Rule 
lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has 
grown from little more than a legislative acorn. 
Such growth may be quite consistent with the 
congressional enactment and with the role of the 
federal judiciary in interpreting it, see J. I. 
Case Co. v Borak, supra, but it would be 
disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 
1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 1942 foreordained the present state of the 
law with respect to Rule lOb-5. It is therefor 
proper that we consider in addition to the 
factors already discussed, what may be described 
as policy considerations when we come to flesh 
out the portions of the law with respect to 
I·' 
which neither the congressional enactment nor 
the administrative regulations offer conclusive 
guidance." Id., at 723. 
In this case, unlike the interpretation of 
3. 
§10(b), we have the plain language §2(1) of the 1933 Act. 
In addition, in Forman, supra, we recognized that the term 
"stock" is to be read in accord with the common 
understanding of its meaning, including the 
characteristics identified in Forman. Finally, as stated 
in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, it is proper for a court to 
consider - as we do today - "policy considerations" in 
construing terms in these Acts. 
Lynda: Your language in Blue Chip Stamps is right on 
target. This would be added - probably at the end of our 
4. 
opinion - as a footnote. Feel free to improve both the 
language and the substance of the foregoing. If any 
further cites- e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur and its progeny-
seem relevant, you might add them. 
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LANDRETH TIMBER COMPANY, PETITIONER v. 
IV AN K. LANDRETH ET AL. 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT 
[April - , 1985] 
JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was fo1,1nd, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
Mter having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
Dennis agreed to purchase all of the common stock in the 
lumber company. Ivan Landreth agreed to stay on as a con-
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sultant for some time to help with the daily operations of the 
mill. Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a cor-
poration formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber 
company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber com-
pany, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Company. Den-
nis and Bolten owned all of petitioner's Class A stock, repre-
senting 85% of the equity, and six other investors together 
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of 
the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77a, et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that 
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a, et 
seq. (the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
knowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities 
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
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held corporation. ~ Appk3a. Relying on United Hous-
ing Foundation v. Forman, 4 1 U. S. 837 (1975), and SEC v. 
W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), the District Court 
ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security" un-
less the purchaser had entered into the transaction with the 
anticipation of earning profits derived from the efforts of 
others. Finding that managerial control of the business had 
passed into the hands of the purchasers, and thus, that the 
transaction was a commercial venture rather than a typical 
investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself;" 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). 
Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a 
"security" as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
4 
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... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those charac-
teristics usually associated with stock as (i) the right to 
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of prof-
its; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothe-
cated; (iv) the ability to confer voting rights in proportion to 
1 We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in § 3(a)(10) 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975). 
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the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreci-
ate in value. I d., at 851. 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with stock. Indeed, the District -{io Pet. for ee,....t. J 
Court so found. ~ App. I 13a. Moreover, unlike in . 
. Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the 
sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the context to 
which the Acts normally apply. It is thus much more likely 
here than in Forman that an investor would believe he was 
covered by the federal securities laws. Under the circum-
stances of this case, the plain meaning of the statutory defini-
tion mandates that the stock be treated as "securities" sub-
ject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress's remedial purpose in en-
acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types 
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 
328 U. S. 293, 299 (1946) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that L _ 
C d d 
eov..u?Y'ene~s\v~ 
ongress i not intend to provide a ~ federal remedy · ' 
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for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 
(1982), we think it would improperly narrow Congress's 
-e.-(0" aP~~ definition of "security" to hold that the traditional 
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner.2 Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled way" to justify treating notes, bonds, and 
other of the definitional categories differently. We address 
these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., for example, the Court consid-
ered whether the 1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold 
interests in land near a proposed oil well drilling. In holding 
that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court 
noted that "the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvi-
ous and commonplace." ~at 351. Rather, it ruled that 
unusual devices such as the leaseholds would also be covered 
2 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L. ? ~ ~ 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). SeeJjijeCP )!'; ;:: @ +) 
infra) G\.t II- l ~. ~ 
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"if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely 
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which 
established their character in commerce as 'investment con-
tracts,' or as 'any interest or instrument commonly known as 
a 'security."' Ibid. 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 }{. 8. 293 (194Ge further elu-
cidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instru-
ment could be considered a "security" if the circumstances 
of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an 
offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled with a 
contract for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting 
the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offer-
ing constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning 
of the 1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
:-11--___ e_n_te-:-:-r..._p-:~rise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
3~ {l.S_j ers." ~at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were "investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their 
money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 3 require us to reject the view that the shares of 
3 Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967), 
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
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stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our 
cases require us in every case to look to the economic sub-
stance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of oth-
ers, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, re-
spondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character-
ized as "securities." Thus, if the Acts were to apply in those 
cases at all, it would have to have been because the economic 
reality underlying the transactionl indicated that the mstru-
[
--5__,\,QU"-..,-.,..t.---;\----;m;;::;-:::::en~~ actually of a type that fa1ls within the usual concept 
· of a security. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument 
involved is traditional stock, plainly within the statutory defi-
nition. There is no need here, as there was in the prior 
cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to 
determine whether the Acts apply. 
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. ...See pp. 19 28, iH:/'1 tg Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital 
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver involved a cer-
tificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. 
See 455 U. S. 551, at 557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of 
deposit involved in Weaver did not fit within the definition's category "cer-
tificate of deposit, for a security." 
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Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." I d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac- r, 
teristics bear out the label. See ~I 2 ., supra) a..~ X L ti- 5(;) 
Second, we would note that the Howey test was designed 
to determine whether a particular instrument is an "invest-
ment contract," not whether it fits within any of the exam-
ples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our 
cases are consistent with this view. 4 ffi~emfbiitmt:tl B1 othe1 _.e._ J--
• In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "s;}urity," 
respondents quote our statement in lnte1 lto:tional B1 otr'u1 haati Team-
sters v. Daniel that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes 
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security.'" 439 
U. S. 551, 558 n. 11 (1979) (quoting Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 852 (1975)). 
We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do. We made 
the statement in Forman in reference to the purchasers' argument that if 
the instruments at issue were not "stock" and were not "investment con-
tracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'" 
within the statutory definition. We stated, as part of our analysis of 
whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived 
"no distinction, for present purposes, between an 'investment contract' and 
an 'instrument commonly known as a "security.'''" 421 U. S., at 852 (em-
phasis added). This was not to say that the Howey test applied to any case 
in which an instrument was alleged to be a security, but only that once the 
label "stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to analyse the case 
differently whether we viewed the instruments as "investment contracts" 
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- ~os4 fJj Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979) (ap-
propriate to turn to the Howey test to "determine whether a 
particu~ financial arrangement constitutes an investment 
cont;~c~{ United Housi Foundation v. Forman, supra; 
see supra;> Moreover, applying the Howey test to 
traditional stock and all other types of instruments listed 
in the statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration 
of many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. Gara-
falo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of 
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p. 
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. AccordJ._ 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Further-
more, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2), 
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration pro-
visions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud 
provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts re-
fute respondents' position. 5 
or as falling within another similarly general category of the definition-an 
"instrument commonly known as a~ecurity.~ Under either of these gen-
eral categories, the Howey test would apply. 
5 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
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We now turn to concern that treating stock as a spe-
cific category of "security" provable by its characteristics 
means that other categories listed in the statutory definition, 
such as notes, must be treated the same way. Although we 
do not decide whether coverage of notes or other instruments 
may be provable by their name and characteristics, we do 
point out several reasons why we think stock may be distin-
guishable from most if not all of the other categories listed in 
the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we~made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be= 
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See _ 
~ ~~~0--\ -::s:::-:u-=p::::ra-=-:11 }.. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional 
\..____= _:/ stock is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that if "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining 
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi-
tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though 
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors,-- U. S. -- (1984), [1Q4 P 
S Ct 297~ "note" may now be viewed as a relatively broad 
term that encompasses instruments with widely varying 
characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer 
context, as commercial paper, or in some other investment 
context. See id., at - lfi64 S. Ct., at 2986 2988]~ We 
here expressly leave until another day the question whether 
"notes" or "bonds" or some other category of instrument 
listed in the definition might be shown "by proving [only] 
the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" may be viewed as 
being in a category by itself for purposes of interpreting the 
scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doc-
trine de ends in each case on whether control has passed to 
t e purchaser. U:rulet the doctr ine, the Acts' eoverage 
WOUld have to ae determit:UHi QR a gase ay ease basis, depend• 
ifig in part; Ofl the pereentage Gf stegk traH:sfcf'!'ed, the num-
ber of pm ehaset s, and what provisiofls for voting aH:d vetG 
'f'ights were alse agreed apeH ay the parties. Thus, eoverage 
by the Acts wotlld ifl most eases be Ufleel'taifl; it is pessible 
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that un:tler some eil'eumstan:ces the same stodt eeald be 
deemeel te be "secu:ritie~i" as to ilome parchasers, but n:et a:s-
to otl~:el's, el' a:s to the seHers, but n:ot the buj' et ~ We be-
lieve these uncertainties attendin the a lica · 't he 
Acts would be intolerable. 'Cf. arine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U. S. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) ecting the argument that the 
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chame-
leon-like, into a "security" once it was pledged). Respond-
ents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase 
the workload of the federal courts by converting state and 
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more 
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction 
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until 
they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a con-
cept as often elusive as the passage of control. 6 Accord 
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146 (CA2 1982). 
v 
In sum, we conclude . that the stock at issue here is a "se-
curity" within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is 
therefore 
Reversed. 
6 It might be argued that this case, involving the transfer of 100% of the 
corporation's stock, is an easy one in which to discern whether control has 
passed. We think even that assertion is open to some question under the 
circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of run-
ning the sawmill themselves and Ivan Landreth apparently stayed on to 
manage the daily affairs of the business. The District Court was required 
to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even requested supplemental facts 
and memoranda on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the 
case. Pet. App. 13a. If this degree of uncertainty attends this case, how 
much greater the unpredictability would be in a case such as Gould v. 
Ruefenacht,- U. S.- (1985), decided today as a companion to the 
case at bar, involving the sale of 50% of a corporation's stock. 
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This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions ·Of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rehuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
Dennis agreed to purchase all of the common stock in the 
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sultant for some time to help with the daily operations of the 
mill. Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a cor-
poration formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber 
company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber com-
pany, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Company. Den-
nis and Bolten owned all of petitioner's Class A stock, repre-
senting 85% of the equity, and six other investors together 
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of 
the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77a, et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that 
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a, et 
seq. (the 1934 Act). · 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
knowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities 
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
-. 
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held corporation. ~ App~13a. Relying on United Hous-
ing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975), and SEC v. 
W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), the District Court 
ruled that the stock could not be considered a "security'' un-
less the purchaser had entered into the transaction with the 
anticipation of earning profits derived from the efforts of 
others. Finding that managerial control of the business had 
passed into the hands of the purchasers, and thus, that the 
transaction was a commercial venture rather than a typical 
investment, the District Court dismissed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord/'l'b~elna:titmal B1 oth-7L 
Brhaed ~ Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 lJ. S. 551, 558 (1979). 
Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a 
"security" as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
4 
83-1961-0PINION 
LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH 
... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those charac-
teristics usually associated with stock as (i) the right to 
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of prof-
its; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothe-
cated; (iv) the ability to confer voting rights in proportion to 
'We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in § 3(a)(10) 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975). 
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the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreci-
ate in value. I d., at 851. 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with stock. Indeed, the District 
Court so found. ~ App. J\f3a. Moreover, unlike m 
Forman, the context of the transaction involved here-the 
sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the{context Eo 
which the Acts normally apply. It is thus much more likely 
here than in Forman that an investor would believe he was 
covered by the federal securities laws. Under the circum-
stances of this case, the plain meaning of the statutory defini-
tion mandates that the stock be treated as "securities" sub-
ject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress's remedial purpose in en-
acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types 
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 
328 U. S. 293, 299 (1946) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that 
Congress did not intend to provide a ~ federal remedy 
lto Fe+. ~r- Cer.f. J 
{!c-i~J of) 
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for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 
(1982), we think it would improperly narrow Congress's 
broad definition of "security" to hold that the traditional 
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner. 2 Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled waJ( ~o justify treating notes, bonds, and 
other of the definitional categories differently. We address 
these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., 83Q U. B. 344 (1943)a-- for example, the Court consid-
ered whether the 1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold 
interests in land near a proposed oil well drilling. In holding 
that the leasehold interests were "securities," the Court 
noted that "the reach of the Act does not stop with the obvi-
ous and commonplace." ~ at 351. Rather, it ruled that 
unusual devices such as the leaseholds would also be covered 
2 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L: 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See ~~· 86 B'i'o 
infr~ 0.. t II - 1.2.- (!) 
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"if it be proved as matter of fact that they were widely 
offered or dealt in under terms or courses of dealing which 
established their character in commerce as 'investment con-
tracts,' or as 'any interest or instrument commonly known as 
a 'security."' Ibid. 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., ffi-92~8--+UJ.:-. ~8~~~9~3+i(1~94~S~al!fuiiirt:tihweT"r eilU:u-:----tl?Trt{, J 
cidated the Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instru-
ment could be considered a "security" if the circumstances 
of the transaction so dictated. At issue in that case was an 
offering of units of a citrus grove development coupled with a 
contract for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting 
the proceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offer-
ing constituted an "investment contract" within the meaning 
of the 1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
J enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-l 9~ -il.S. 1 L.__...----er-s."" -=-~71 at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were "investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their 
money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 3 require us to reject the view that the shares of 
3 Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967), 
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
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stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our 
cases require us in every case to look to the economic sub-
stance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of oth-
ers, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, re-
spondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character-
ized as "securities." Thus, if the Acts were to apply in those 
cases at all, it would have to have been because the economic 
reality underlying the transactio indicated that the instru-
( ~ 5 Wl~.l----m-e-n--:1fwattactually of a type that falls within the usual concept 
of a ~curity. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instrument 
involved is traditional stock, plainly within the statutory defi-
nition. There is no need here, as there was in the prior 
cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the instrument to 
determine whether the Acts apply. 
Marif\e ~ v. 
(A)(Av~r, sup~, 
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. 'See flfl· lQ ~. il-&fo:tQ' Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital 
shares in a state savings and loan association, and Weaver involved a cer-
tificate of deposit and a privately negotiated profit sharing agreement. 
See 466 ~· S. 65~ at 557 n. 5, for an ex lanation of why the certificate of 
deposit involved · 1 not fit within the definition s category cer-
tificate of deposit, for a security." 
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Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac-
teristics bear out the label. See1'f'· 9 1~ supra) ct..t lf- 5€) 
Second, we would note that the Howey test was designed 
to determine whether a particular instrument is an "invest-
ment contract," not whether it fits within any of the exam-
ples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our 
cases are consistent with this view. 4 hete'f%8itte'l'hall1'Pethe'l" 6 
• In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "s~urity," 
respondents quote our statement in ll~ttJJ national B1 othe1 hood=v Team-
sters v. Daniel that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes 
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security."' 439 
U. S. 551, 558 n. 11 (1979) (quoting Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 852 (1975)). 
We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as respondents do. We made 
the statement in Forman in reference to the purchasers' argument that if 
the instruments at issue were not "stock" and were not "investment con-
tracts," at least they were "instrument[s] commonly known as a 'security'" 
within the statutory definition. We stated, as part of our analysis of 
whether the instruments were "investment contracts," that we perceived 
"no distinction, for present purposes, between an 'investment contract' and 
an 'instrument commonly known as a "security.""' 421 U. S., at 852 (em-
phasis added). This was not to say that the Howey test applied to any case 
in which an instrument was alleged to be a security, but only that once the 
label "stock" did not hold true, we perceived no reason to analyse the case 
differently whether we viewed the instruments as "investment contracts" 
83-1961-0PINION 
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~Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979) (ap-
propriate to turn to the Howey test to "determine whether a 
particul financial arrangement constitutes an investment 
contract"); United Housi Foundation v. Forman su ra· 
see supra Moreover, applying the Howey test to 
traditional stoc.K and all other types of instruments listed 
in the statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration 
of many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. Gara-
falo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of 
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p. 
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord,( 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Further-
more, although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S. C. §77d(2), 
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration pro-
visions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud 
provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts re-
fute respondents' position. 5 
or as falling within another similarly general category of the definition-an 
"instrument commonly known as a.J.:;ecurity~ Under either of these gen-
eral categories, the Howey test would apply. 
6 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does 
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B 
We now turn to ~ern that treating stock as a spe- +he (curt 4D ArftAls • 5. 
cific category of "security" provable by its characteristics 
means that other categories listed in the statutory definition, 
such as notes, must be treated the same way. Although we 
do not decide whether coverage of notes or other instruments 
may be provable by their name and characteristics, we do 
point out several reasons why we think stock may be distin-
guishable from most if not all of the other categories listed in 
the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be-
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See ~· le,e_ 
[r-~-A.-J--a.-t~if'-~5 .... 0...,{--:-su_p_r_a,~ Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional _ . stock is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining 
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi-
tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though 
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiner's 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors,-- U. S. -- (1984), i194 
~. Ct. 2S~"note" may now be viewed as a relatively broad 
term that encompasses instruments with widely varying 
characteristics, depending on whether issued in a consumer 
context, as commercial pa~er or. in.~ome o.t.her investment 
context. See id., at J\fi64 ~. et, at l9~8 2g~~ We 
here expressly leave until another day the question whether 
"notes" or "bonds" or some other category of instrument 
listed in the definition might be shown "by proving [only] 
the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" may be viewed as 
being in a category by itself for purposes of interpreting the 
scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doc-
trine depends in each case on whether control has passed to 
e pure aser. Yaae:P --tR.e aeet:riHe, the Aets' eo v erage 
..weN.la have te he deteriniHea eH a: ea3e•h, =ea3e ha3i3, depend• 
i:Ag i:A ~~ ea tR.e l"e:reentage ef steele t:ra:HsfeHea, tR.e Hl:lffi 
BeF of pm:chasers, a:Ad m}:}at; tm:pri~;iQ:Ai tQr lT9ti:ag aaa veta 
~Btl! WQFQ alse ag:peea 1:1!"6H ey the partie..,, 'Fhn..,, eeve:ra:ge 
..Qy tR.e f.zets we\ila i:a mest eases ee aaeel"ta:ia; it is J3essiele 
Q.-
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that undet some ch cumstance~ tae ~ftme stock could be 
..Qeemeel te ee "~ecut ttles" as to S011Ie pUI chasers, '9-at Ret as 
-tg g(b~ri , or ai to tbi sellePB, lin~t Bet tae al::lyei"i We be-
lieve these uncertainties attending the applicability of the ~ 
Acts would be intolerable. @ Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U. S. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) (rejecting the argument that the 
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chame-
leon-like, into a "security" once it was pledged). Respond-
ents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase 
the workload of the federal courts by converting state and 
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more 
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction 
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until 
they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a con-
cept as often elusive as the passage of control..P- Accord) }-
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146 (CA2 1982). 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "se-
curity" within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is 
therefore 
Reversed. 
6 It might be argued that this case, involving the transfer of 100% of the 
corporation's stock, is an easy one in which to discern whether control has 
passed. We think even that assertion is open to some question under the 
circumstances of this case, as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of run-
ning the sawmill themselves and Ivan Landreth apparently stayed on to 
manage the daily affairs of the business. The District Court was required 
to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even requested supplemental facts 
and memoranda on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the 
case. Pet. App. 13a. If this degree of uncertainty attends this case, how 
much greater the unpredictability would be in a case such as GCYUld v. 
Ruefenacht,- U. S. - (1985), decided today as a companion to the 
case at bar, involving the sale of 50% of a corporation's stock. 
)avtdv i 
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It may be argued that on the facts of this case, the 
doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% of 
a corporation's stock presumptively transfers control. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question, 
however, as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running 
the sawmill themselves. Ivan Landreth apparently stayed 
on to manage the daily affairs of the business. Some 
commentators who support the sale of business doctrine 
believe that a purchaser who has the ability to exert 
control but chooses not to do so may deserve the Acts • 
protection if he is just a passive investor not engaged in 
the daily management of the business. Easley, Recent 
2. 
Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doctrine, 39 Bus. 
Law. 929, 971-972 (1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a 
Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the 
District Court was required to undertake extensive fact-
finding, and even requested supplemental facts and 
memoranda on the issue of control, before it was able to 
decide the case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the 
sale of business doctrine would also have to be applied to 
cases in which less than 100% of a company's stock was 
sold. This would inevitably lead to difficult questions 
of line-drawing. The Acts' coverage would in every case 
depend not only on the percentage of stock transferred, 
but also such factors as the number of purchasers and what 
provisions for voting and veto rights were agreed upon by 
3. 
the parties. As we explain more fully in Gould v. 
Ruefenacht, u.s. --' (1985}, decided today as a 
companion to this case, coverage by the Acts would in most 
cases be unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time 
the stock was sold. 
.. 
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This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). ./ 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
Dennis"'agreed to purchase all of the common stock in the 
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sultant for some time to help with the daily operations of the 
mill. Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a cor-
poration formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber 
company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber com-
pany, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Company. Den-
nis and Bolten owned all of petitioner's Class A stock, repre-
senting 85% of the equity, and six other investors together 
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of 
the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77a, et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that 
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a, et 
seq. (the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
knowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities 
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
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held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975) , and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), 
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be consid-
ered a "security" unless the purchaser had entered into the 
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived 
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control 
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers, 
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture 
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Dan-
iel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a "security" as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
4 
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... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850. We identifi~d those charac-
teristics usually associated with ock as (i) the right to 
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of prof-
its; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or hypothe-
cated; (iv) the ~y to confer voting rights in proportion to 
1 We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in § 3(a)(10) 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975). 
' . 
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the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreci-
ate in value. I d., at 851. 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with stock. Indeed, the District ~ 
Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Moreover, un-
like in Forman, the context of the transaction involved 
here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the kind 
of context to which the Acts normally apply. It is thus much 
more likely here than in Forman that an investor would be-
lieve he was covered by the federal securities laws. Under 
the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of the statu-
tory definition mandates that the stock be treated as "securi-
ties" subject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress's remedial purpose in en-
acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types 
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 
328 U. S. 293, 299 (1946) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that 
Congress did not intend to provide a comprehensive federal 
' 0 
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remedy for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 
556 (1982), we think it would improperly narrow Congress's 
broad definition of "security" to hold that the traditional 
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner. 2 Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treat-
ing notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories 
differently. We address these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., supra, for example, the Court considered whether the 
1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near 
a proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in-
terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of 
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace." 
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such 
2 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L. 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at 
11-12. 
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as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as 
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under 
terms or courses of dealing which established their character 
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" Ibid. 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the 
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could 
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the trans-
action so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of 
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract 
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the pro-
ceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering con-
stituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers." 328 U. S., at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were "investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their 
money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 3 require us to reject the view that the shares of 
3 Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967), 
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
83-1961-0PINION 
8 LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH 
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our 
cases require us in every case to look to the economic sub-
stance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of oth-
ers, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, re-
spondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character-
ized as "securities." Thus, if the Acts were to apply in those ~---~ 
cases at all, it would have to have been because the economic 
reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instru-
ments were actually of a type that falls within the usual con-
cept of a security. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instru-
ment involved is traditional stock, plainly within the 
statutory definition. There is no need here, as there was in 
the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the in-
strument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings 
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a pri-
vately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 
supra, at 557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit in-
volved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of de-
posit, for a security." 
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Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac-
teristics bear out the label. See supra, 4-5. 
Second, we would note that the Howey~ test was designed 
to determine whether a particular instrument is an "invest-
ment contract," not whether it fits within any of the exam-
ples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our 
cases are consistent with this view. 4 Teamsters v. Daniel, 
• In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security," 
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel that the Howey 
test "'embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's 
decisions defining a security.'" 439 U. S. 551, 558 n. 11 (1979) (quoting 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 852 (1975)). We do not read this bit of dicta as 
broadly as respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in refer-
ence to the purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not 
"stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instru-
ment[s] commonly known as a 'security' " within the statutory definition. 
We stated, as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "invest-
ment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, 
between an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a 
"security.""' 421 U.S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say 
that the Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged 
to be a security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we 
perceived no reason to analyse the case differently whether we viewed the 
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly 
? .. 
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439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979) (appropriate to turn to the Howey 
test to "determine whether a particular financial arrange-
ment constitutes an investment contract"); United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, supra; see supra, at 7. Moreover, 
applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other 
types of instruments listed in the statutory definition would 
make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments su-
perfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 
1982). See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of 
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p. 
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord, 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Further-
more, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2), 
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration pro-
visions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud 
provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts re-
fute respondents' position. 5 
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a 
'security.' " Under either of these general categories, the Howey test 
would apply. 
5 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does 
not involve a security.'' L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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B 
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating 
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics means that other categories listed in the stat-
utory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same 
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes 
or other instruments may be provable by their name and 
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think 
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other 
categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be-
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at 
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock 
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining 
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi-
tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though 
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
' . 
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a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized JoineYs 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors,-- U. S. -- (1984), "note" 
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encom-
passes instruments with widely varying characteristics, 
depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as com-
mercial paper, or in some other investment context. See 
id., at --. We here expressly leave until another day the 
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category 
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by 
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" 
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of 
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doc-
trine depends in each case on whether control has passed to 
the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this 
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% 
ofacorporation'sstock~y"transferscontrol. We ~ 
think even that assertion is open to some question, however, 
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill 
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage 
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who 
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser 
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so 
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may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive inves-
tor not engaged in the daily management of the business. 
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doc-
trine, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 (1984); Seldin, When Stock 
is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, 
the District Court was required to undertake extensive fact-
finding, and even requested supplemental facts and memo-
randa on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the 
case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale 
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in 
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This 
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing. 
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on 
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as 
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and 
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain 
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, -- U. S. --, --
(1985), decided today as a companion to this case, coverage 
by the Acts would in most cases be unknown and unknowable 
to the parties at the time the stock was sold. We believe 
these uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts 
would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U. S. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) (rejecting the argument that the 
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chame-
leon-like, into a "security" once it was pledged). Respond-
ents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase 
the workload of the federal courts by converting state and 
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more 
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction 
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until 
.they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a con-
cept s o t~lusive as the passage of control. Accord, 
Golden v. GaraJalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146 (CA2 1982). 
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v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "se-
curity" within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
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This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
Dennis ftgt eed to pm chas« all of the common stock in the 
lumber company. I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a con-
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sultant for some time to help with the dail o erations of the ke... ~~d 
mil . Dennis assigned the stock to B & D Company, a cor-
poration formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber 
company stock. B & D then merged with the lumber com-
pany, forming petitioner Landreth Timber Com an . Den-
nis and Bolten a o petitioner's Class A stock, repre- ~&\ a.c~~tt. 
senting 85% of the equity, and six other investors together 
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of 
the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77a, et seq. , (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that 
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a, et 
seq. (the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
knowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities 
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
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held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), 
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be consid-
ered a "security" unless the purchaser had entered into the 
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived 
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control 
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers, 
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture 
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Dan-
iel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a "security" as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
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... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity" within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850. We identified tho ac-
teristics usually associated with stock as (i) the right to 
receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of prof-
its; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be led ed or h othe-
cated; (iv) the ability tE&-confer votm ights in proportion to 
1 We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in § 3(a)(10) 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555 n. 3 (1982); United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847 n. 12 (1975). 
' . 
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the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to appreci-
ate in value.~ Id., at 851. 
Under the acts of Forman, we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with stock. n ee , the 1strict 
Court so found. App. to Pet. or Cert. 13a. Moreover, un-
like in Forman, the context of the transaction involved 
here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of the kind 
of~t9Kj to which the Acts normally apply. It is thus much 
more likely here than in Forman that an investor would be-
lieve he was covered by the federal securities laws. Under 
the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of the statu-
tory definition mandates that the stock be treated as "securi-
ties" subject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress's remedial purpose in en-
acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types 
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 
328 U. S. 293, 299 (1946) (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d 
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that 
Congress did not intend to provide a comprehensive federal 
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remedy for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 
556 (1982), we think it would improperly narrow Congress's 
broad definition of "security" to hold that the traditional 
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner.J\ Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treat-
ing notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories 
differently. We address these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp. , supra, for example, the Court considered whether the 
1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near 
a proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in-
terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of 
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace." 
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such 
~---zProfessor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L. 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at 
11-12. 
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as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as 
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under 
terms or courses of dealing which established their character 
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security.'" Ibid. 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the 
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could 
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the trans-
action so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of 
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract 
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the pro-
ceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering con-
stituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers." 328 U. S., at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were "investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their 
money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based~ require us to reject the view that the shares of 
\ u/ ----A Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967), 
V and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
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stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our 
cases require us in every case to look to the economic sub-
stance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of oth-
ers, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, re-
spondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character-
ized as "securities." [Thus, if the Acts were to apply in those 
cases at all, it would have to have been because the economic 
reality underlying the transactions indicated that the instru-
ments were actually of a type that falls within the usual con-
cept of a security. In the case at bar, in contrast, the instru-
ment involved is traditional stock, plainly within the 
statutory definition. There is no need here, as there was in 
the prior cases, to look beyond the characteristics of the in-
strument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings 
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a pri-
vately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 
supra, at 557 n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit in-
volved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of de-
posit, for a security." 
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Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac-
teristics bear out the label. See supra, 4-5. 
~~----~~--~----/ Second, we would note that the H oweyA"test was designed 
to determine whether a particular instrument is an "invest-
ment contract," not whether it fits within any of the exam-
ples listed in the statutory definition of "security." Our \ S/ 
cases are consistent with this view.)\ Teamsters v. Daniel, \/' 
----zln support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Jlowey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security," 
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel that the Howey 
test "'embodies the essential attributes that run through all of the Court's 
decisions defining a security."' 439 U. S. 551, 558 n. 11 (1979) (quoting 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 852 (1975)). We do not read this bit of dicta as 
broadly as respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in refer-
ence to the purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not 
"stock" and were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instru-
ment[s] commonly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. 
We stated, as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "invest-
ment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, 
between an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a 
"security."'" 421 U.S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say 
that the Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged 
to be a security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we 
perceived no reason to analyse the case differently whether we viewed the 
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly 
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439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979) (appropriate to turn to the Howey 
test to "determine whether a particular financial arrange-
ment constitutes an investment contract"); United Housing 
Foundation v. Forman, supra; see supra, at 7. Moreover, 
applying the Howey test to traditional stock and all other 
types of instruments listed in the statutory definition would 
make the Acts' enumeration of many types of instruments su-
perfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 
1982). See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of 
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g., 1934 Act,§§ 14, 16, 15 U.S. C. §§78n, 78p. 
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord, 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Further-
more, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2), 
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration pro-
visions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud 
provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts re-
fute respondents' position{ ~ 
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a 
'security." ' Under either of these general categories, the Howey test 
\ b /. would apply. 
\/ --.,~In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does 
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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B 
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating 
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics means that other categories listed in the stat-
utory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same 
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes 
or other instruments may be provable by their name and 
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think 
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other 
categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be-
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at 
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock 
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining 
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi-
tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though 
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
83-1961-0PINION 
12 LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH 
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiner's 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors,-- U. S. -- (1984), "note" 
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encom-
passes instruments with widely varying characteristics, 
depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as com-
mercial paper, or in some other investment context. See 
id., at--. We here expressly leave until another day the 
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category 
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by 
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" 
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of 
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doc-
trine depends in each case on whether control has passed to 
the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this 
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% 
of a corporation's stock f,WesY~ptivel~ transfers control. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question, however, 
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill 
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage 
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who 
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser 
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so 
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may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive inves-
tor not engaged in the daily management of the business. 
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doc-
trine, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 (1984); Seldin, When Stock 
is Not a Security, 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, 
the District Court was required to undertake extensive fact-
finding, and even requested supplemental facts and memo-
randa on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the 
case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale 
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in 
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This 
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing. 
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on 
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as 
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and 
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain 
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, -- U. S. --, --
(1985), decided today as a companion to this case, coverage 
by the Acts would in most cases be unknown and unknowable 
to the parties at the time the stock was sold. We believe 
these uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts 
would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
U. S. 551, 559 n. 9 (1982) (rejecting the argument that the 
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chame-
leon-like, into a "security" once it was pledged). Respond-
ents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase 
the workload of the federal courts by converting state and 
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more 
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction 
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until 
they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a con-
cept as often elusive as the passage of control. Accord, 
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1145-1146 (CA2 1982). 
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v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "se-
curity" within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
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JUSTICE POWELL~ the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the 
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumber company. 
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some 
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant 
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis as-
signed the stockhe purchased to B & D Co an a corpora-
tion formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the umber com-
pany stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, 
forming petitioner Landreth Timber C ~ an . Dennis and 
Bolten then acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, repre-
senting 85% of the equity, and six other investors together 
owned the Class B stock, representing the remaining 15% of 
the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
} 
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
~ § 77ao et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that 
respondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of I 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a0 et l.J$ 
seq. (the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
lmowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
;. ,.~.?; ~-r I 
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majority'' of courts that had held that the federal securities 
laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. v Relying on 
United;.- Housing Foundation/\. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946) / 
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be consid-
ered a "security'' unless the purchaser had entered into the 
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived 
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control 
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers, 
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture 
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). "" It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. --:;.:;::_-- U. S. -- (1984). We t./6'1 / 
now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case SH STY 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." '~" MA U:,t I 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 2 • - O,Z.. 
(1975f'(PoWELL, J., concurrinJ); accord, Teamsters v. Da~n ..J, 
iel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, ?~7~(Ld.~d. 
15 U. S. C. § 77b(1), defines a "security" as including ~-- L.t< ~ r P,....:... 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or ri?'ht to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), "' 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation,_ v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. v 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"som~ of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851,' recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser just~bly [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850.1 We identified those charac-
teristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right 
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of 
1 We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in§ 3(a)(10)"' 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) ~f the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. / @ 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 5551\n. 3 (1982{ United Housing 1 c;__f. 
Foundation/\v. Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 84~n. 12 (1975). " ')I~ rn,; 
C....oll\fe~ f J 
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or 
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring votin o rights in propor-
tion to the number of shares owne ; and (v) the capacity to 
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851. ( 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. v 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the 
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. ,......More-
over, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction in-
volved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of 
the kind of •m~r 1iie.lto which the Acts normally apply. It 
is thus much more likely here than in Forman that an inves-
tor would believe he was covered by the federal securities 
laws. Under the circumstances of this case, the plain mean-
ing of the statutory definition mandates that the stock be 
treated as "securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress'4 remedial purpose in en- liP? { 
2 Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here 
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock, 
the kind of stock ordinarily at issue in cases involving the sale of a business. 
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and 
still be covered by the Acts. 
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
IAIUW: and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types 
[.'I I of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
~-r ordinary concept of a security.'" ""'SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 
j 1M- / ~ / 328 U. S. ~J 299 fl-94~ (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d 
1- Cong., 1stSess . .All (1933)): Although we recognize that 
1 Congress did not intend to provide a comprehensive federal 
remedy for all fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 
556 (1982); we think it would improperly narrow Congress'f Mt / 
broad definition of "security" to hold that the traditional 
stock at issue here falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner. 3 Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to~old this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, io justify treat-
ing notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories 
differently. We address these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
3 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L. 
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., su ra for example, the Court considered whether the 
1933 Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near 
a proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in-
terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of 
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace." v 
320 U. S., at 351. ,... Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such 
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as 
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under 
terms or courses of dealing which established their character 
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' " Ibid. "' 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the 
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could 
be considered a "security'' if the circumstances of the trans-
action so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of 
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract 
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the pro-
ceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering con-
stituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers." " 328 U. S., at 301:' 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were "investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. -:; 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of 
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our 
cases require us in every case to look to the economic sub-
stance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of oth-
ers, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, re-
spondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character-
ized as "securities." See n@ 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts 
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been 
• Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knigh~ 389 U. S. 332 (1967)/ 
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings 
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a pri-
vately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 
supra, at 55~ n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit 
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of 
deposit, for a security." ' 
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions in-
dicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls 
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in 
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly 
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as 
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteris-
tics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." v' I d., at 355. "' Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac-
teristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5. 
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality 
test was designed to determine whether a particular instru-
ment is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within 
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "se-
curity." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Team-
5 In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security," 
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Danie~?at the Howey -1- '13 7 1/. 5. S tJ /.)55'~,.. /(/f7 
test "'embodies the essential attributes that run U1r~ all of the Court's 
decisions defining a securit)l "' "@911. S. 55'r,~f (quoting )1,/ ;;f.J 
Forman, 421 U. S. @ 852 ft975)). We do not reaa thisoro·f dicta as :::J 
broadly as respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in refer-
ence to the purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not 
"stock'' and were not ''investment contracts," at least they were "instru-
ment[s] commonly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. 
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sters v. Daniel , 439 u. s@ 558 {t979) (appropriate to turn 1" oVt I l1h 
. , to the Howey test to "detennine whether a particular finan:,-
te/t;/ltns/n{' J cial @ angemenb constitutes an investment contract"); { ) ~ 
/).Inc. .; United Housing Foundatio~v. Forman,~ see supra, 1/:J- 1 fl,f. 8' :3 7 1tf75 1 
) - at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test t~tional stock 
and all other types of instruments listed in the statutory defi-
nition would make the Acts' enumeration of many types of in-
struments superfluous. Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 
1144 (CA2 1982{ See Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 
343 (1967) . ./ 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of 
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g. , 1934 Act,§§ 14, 16,'15 U.S. C. §§78n, 78p/ 
Eliminating from the definition of "security'' instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord, 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983) . .; Further-
more, although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S. C. §77d(2),v 
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration pro-
visions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud 
We stated, as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "invest-
ment contracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, 
between an 'investment contract' .~d an 'instrument commonly known as a 
"security.""' 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say 
that the Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged 
to be a security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we Q 
perceived no reason to analyfe the case differently whether we viewed the. 'Z. :.if'? 
instruments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly 
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a 
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provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts re-
fute respondents' position. 6 
B 
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating 
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics means that other categories listed in the stat-
utory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same 
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes 
or other instruments may be provable by their name and 
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think 
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other 
categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and v 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. v Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be-
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at 
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock 
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining 
whether an instrument is an ''investment contract" to tradi-
1 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does 
not involve a security.""' L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
' 0 
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tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983)( As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though 
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
a security as to foreclose further analysis." • I d., at 212 v 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344 (1943),vthe Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. 1 Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850 . .; As we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors,~ U. S. -- (1984), "note" 
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encom-
passes instruments with widely varying characteristics, 
depending on whether issued in a consumer context, as com-
mercial paper, or in some other investment context. See 
id., at--. We here expressly leave until another day the 
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category 
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by 
proving [only] the document itself." 1 SEC v. C. M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355."' We hold only that "stock" 
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of 
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing · 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doc-
trine depends in each case on whether control has passed to 
~ I 
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the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this 
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% 
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question, however, 
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill 
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage 
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who 
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser 
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so 
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive inves-
tor not engaged in the daily management of the business. 
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doc-
trin 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 (1984)( Seldin, When Stock 
is Not a Security; 37 Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, 
the District Court was required to un ertake extensive act-
finding, and even requested supplemental facts and memo-
randa on the issue of control, before it was able to decide the 
case. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. v 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale 
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in 
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This 
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing. 
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on 
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as 
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and 
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain 
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, E-- U. S. --, --=3) 
, decided today as a companion to this case, coverage 
by the Acts would in most cases be unknown and unknowable 
to the parties at the time the stock was sold. We believe 
these uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts 
j I would be intolerable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 
f l£lrt 'ttf j U.S. @ 559An. 9 ~(rejecting the argument that the 
certificate of deposit at issue there was transformed, chame-
leon-like, into a "security'' once it was pledged). Respond-
ents argue that adopting petitioner's approach will increase 
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the workload of the federal courts by converting state and 
common law fraud claims into federal claims. We find more 
daunting, however, the prospect that parties to a transaction s 
may never know whether they are covered by the Acts until , / 
they engage in extended discovery and litigation over a con- &f.:, t·'t) 
cept as often elusive as the passage of contr~~ -1-/ 
Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d ® 1145-1146 0t§J 1 Mt 0 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "se-
curity'' within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the 
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumbe_r company. 
\985 
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some 
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant 
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis as-
signed the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation 
formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company 
stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, form-
ing petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then 
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of 
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class 
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that re-
spondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 7~a et seq. 
(the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
knowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities 
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), 
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be consid-
ered a "security" unless the purchaser had entered into the 
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived 
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control 
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers, 
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture 
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Dan-
iel , 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77b(1), defines a "security'' as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
4 
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
... or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those charac-
teristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right 
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of 
'We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in § 3(a)(10) 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975). 
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or 
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in propor-
tion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to 
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851. 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the 
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. More-
over, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction in-
volved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of 
the kind of context to which the Acts normally appl;Y. It is 
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor 
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of 
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as 
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in en-
2 Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here 
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock, 
the kind of stock ordinarily at issue in cases involving the sale of a business. 
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and 
still be covered by the Acts. 
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types 
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 
328 U. S., at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess., 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that Congress did 
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all 
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we 
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad de~ition 
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here 
falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner. 3 Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treat-
ing notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories 
differently. We address these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
3 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L. 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at 
11-12. 
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933 
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a 
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in-
terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of 
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace." 
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such 
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as 
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under 
terms or courses of dealing which established their character 
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid. 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the 
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could 
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the trans-
action so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of 
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract 
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the pro-
ceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering con-
stituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers." 328 U. S., at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were "investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their 
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of 
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our 
cases require us in every case to look to the economic sub-
stance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of oth-
ers, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, re-
spondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character:.. 
ized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts 
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been 
• Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967), 
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings 
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a pri-
vately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit 
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of 
deposit, for a security." 
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions in-
dicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls 
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in 
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly 
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as 
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteris-
tics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security'' simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac-
teristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5. 
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality 
test was designed to determine whether a particular instru-
ment is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within 
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "se-
curity." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Team-
5 In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security," 
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes 
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security'" (quoting 
Forman, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as 
respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in reference to the 
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and 
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] com-
monly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. We stated, 
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sters v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the 
Howey test to "determine whether a particular financial rela-
tionship constitutes an investment contract"); United Hous-
ing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see 
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to tradi-
tional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the 
statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration of 
many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. 
Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin 
v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the .. transfer of 
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p. 
Eliminating from the definition of "security'' instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord, 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Further-
more, although §4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S. C. '§77d(2), 
exempts private transactions from the Act's registration pro-
visions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud 
as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment con-
tracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between 
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "secu-
rity."'" 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the 
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a 
security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we per-
ceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the in-
struments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly 
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a 
'security.'" Under either of these general categories, the Howey test 
would apply. 
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provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts re-
fute respondents' position. 6 
B 
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating 
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics means that other categories listed in the stat-
utory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same 
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes 
or other instruments may be provable by their name and 
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think 
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other 
categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be-
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at 
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditioNal stock 
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining 
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi-
6 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does 
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though 
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. A.s we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors, 468 U. S. -- (1984), "note" 
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encom-
passes instruments with widely varying characteristics, de-
pending on whether issued in a consumer context, as com-
mercial paper, or in some other investment context. See 
id., at --. We here expressly leave until another day the 
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category 
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by 
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" 
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of 
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
case. By respondents' own admission, application of the doc-
trine depends in each case on whether control has passed to 
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the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this 
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% 
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question, however, 
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill 
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage 
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who 
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser 
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so 
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is just a passive inves-
tor not engaged in the daily management of the business. 
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doc-
trine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for 
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of 
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities LawsfW7~~7=---- ') 
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District c6\n-t 
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even 
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of 
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 13a. 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale 
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in 
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This 
would inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing. 
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on 
the percentage of stock transferred, but also such factors as 
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and 
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain 
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at --, decided 
today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts 
would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to the par-
ties at the time the stock was sold. We believe these uncer-
tainties attending the applicability of the Acts would be intol-
erable. Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9 
(rejecting the argument that the certificate of deposit at issue 
-· 
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there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" 
once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting peti-
tioner's approach will increase the workload of the federal 
courts by converting state and common law fraud claims into 
federal claims. We find more daunting, however, the pros-
pect that parties to a transaction may never know whether 
they are covered by the Acts until they engage in extended j 
discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the 
passage of control. Accord, Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d-) a:t" 
1145-1146. 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "se-
curity'' within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is 
therefore 
Reversed. 
lfp/ss 05/16/85 LAND SALLY-POW 
2nd draft 
Justice Stevens dissents on the ground that 
Congress did not intend the antifraud provisions of the 
federal security laws to apply to "the private sale of a 
substantial ownership interest in a business where the 
transactions is a sale of stock rather than of assets". 
Justice Stevens, of course, is correct in saying that it 
is clear from the legislative history of the Securities 
Acts of 1933 and 1934 that Congress was concerned 
primarily with transactions "in securities ••. traded in 
a public market". See United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 u.s. 837, 849 (1975). It also is true that 
there is no indication in the legislative history that 
2. 
Congress considered the type of transactions involved in 
this case and in Gould v. Ruefenacht, infra. 
The history is simply silent - as it is with 
respect to other transactions to which these Acts have 
been applied by the Commission and judicial interpretation 
over the half century since this legislation was adopted. 
One only need mention the expansive interpretation of 
§lO(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 adopted by the 
Commission. What the Court said in Blue Chip Stamps v. 
Manor Drug Stores, 421 u.s. 723 (1975) is relevant: 
"When we deal with private actions under Rule 
lOb-5, we deal with a judicial oak which has 
grown from little more than a legislative acorn. 
Such growth may be quite consistent with the 
congressional enactment and with the role of the 
federal judiciary in interpreting it, see J. I. 
Case Co. v Borak, supra, but it would be 
disingenuous to suggest that either Congress in 
1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission 
in 1942 foreordained the present state of the 
law with respect to Rule lOb-5. It is therefor 
proper that we consider in addition to the 
factors already discussed, what may be described 
as policy considerations when we come to flesh 
out the portions of the law with respect to 
which neither the congressional enactment nor 
the administrative regulations offer conclusive 
guidance." Id., at 723. 
In this case, unlike the interpretation of 
3. 
§lO(b), we have the plain language §2(1) of the 1933 Act. 
In addition, in Forman, supra, we recognized that the term 
"stock" is to be read in accord with the common 
understanding of its meaning, including the 
characteristics identified in Forman. Finally, as stated 
in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, it is proper for a court to 
consider - as we do today - "policy considerations" in 
construing terms in these Acts. 
Lynda: Your language in Blue Chip Stamps is right on 
target. 
~,to ~r?~--
This would be ad~ed - probably at the end of our 
1\ 
4. 
opinion - as a footnote. Feel free to improve both the 
language and the substance of the foregoing. If any 
further cites- e.g., Texas Gulf Sulphur and its progeny-
seem relevant, you might add them. 
---
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the 
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumber company. 
81 -ocn c:::C:: 
CD""" ,.-::o s -ITI:::O n~,.., 
-< ~,..,n - -n~ _, oo <:: :z; c::rr• 
(J)::oo 
a c.: 
0 ~c:: .. --1(/) -0\ 
83-1961-0PINION 
2 LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH 
I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some 
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant 
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis as-
signed the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation 
formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company 
stock. B & D then merged with the lumber company, form-
ing petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then 
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of 
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class 
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that re-
spondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 7~a et seq. 
(the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
knowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities 
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), 
the District Court ruled that the stock could not be consid-
ered a "security" unless the purchaser had entered into the 
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived 
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control 
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers, 
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture 
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
·case whether the. economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
II . 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Dan-
iel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77b(1), defines a "security" as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
4 
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
. . . or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the fot:egoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those charac-
teristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right 
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of 
'We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in§ 3(a)(10) 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975). 
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or 
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in propor-
tion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to 
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851. 
Under the facts of Forman, we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the 
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. More-
over, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction in-
volved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of 
the kind of context to which the Acts normally applr. It is 
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor 
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of 
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as 
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in en-
2 Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here 
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock, 
e o stoc · at issue in cases involving the sale of a business. 
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and 
still be covered by the Acts. 
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 'the many types 
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security."' SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 
328 U. S., at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess., 11 (1933)). Although we recognize that Congress did 
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all 
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we 
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad definition 
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here 
falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner.3 Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treat-
ing notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories 
differently. We address these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
3 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L. 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at 
11-12. 
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933 
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a 
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in-
terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of 
the Act does not stop with the obvious and commonplace." 
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such 
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as 
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under 
terms or courses of dealing which established their character 
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid. 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the 
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could 
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the trans-
action so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of 
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a. contract 
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the pro-
ceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering con-
stituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers." 328 U. S., at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were "investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their 
83-1961-0PINION 
8 LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH 
money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of 
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
their name and characteristics. Instead the ar e that our 
cases require us in every to ook to the economic su -
stance of the transaction to determine whether the Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of oth-
ers, but to buy a company that it could manage and control. 
Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Congress 
intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepreneur, 
who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased just 
as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apartments 
they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, re-
spondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character-
ized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts 
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been 
4 Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967), 
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings 
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a pri-
vately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit 
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of 
deposit, for a security." 
' . 
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions in-
dicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls 
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in 
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly 
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as 
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteris-
tics of. the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." /d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac-
teristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5. 
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality 
test was designed to determine whether a particular instru-
ment is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within 
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "se-
curity." Our cases are consistent with this view.5 Team-
5 In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security," 
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes 
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security"' (quoting 
Forman, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as 
respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in reference to the 
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and 
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] com-
monly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. We stated, 
' . 
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sters v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the 
Howey test to "determine whether a particular financial rela-
tionship constitutes an investment contract"); United Hous-
ing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see 
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to tradi-
tional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the 
statutory definition would make the Acts' enumeration of 
many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v. 
Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin 
v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not 
privately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of 
control to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p. 
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord, 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Further-
more, although §4(2) of the 1933 Act 15 U.S. C. ·§77d(2), 
exempts ~rivat, transactions from the Act's registration pro-
visions, there is no comparable exemption from the antifraud 
as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment con-
tracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between 
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "secu-
rity.""' 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the 
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a 
security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we per-
ceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the in-
struments as ''investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly 
general category of the definition-an ''instrument commonly known as a 
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provisions. Thus, the structure and language of the Acts re-
fute respondents' position. 6 
B 
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating 
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics means that other categories listed in the stat-
utory definition, such as notes, must be treated the same 
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage of notes 
or other instruments may be provable by their name and 
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think 
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other 
categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be-
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at 
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock 
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for detennining 
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi-
6 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does 
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though 
his signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors, 468 U. S. -- (1984), "note" 
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encom-
passes instruments with widely varying characteristics, de-
pending on whether issued in a consumer context, as com-
mercial paper, or in some other investment context. See 
id., at --. We here expressly leave until another day the 
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category 
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by 
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" 
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of 
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
By respondents' own admission, application of the doc-
depends in each case on whether control has passed to 
' 0 
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the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this 
case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% 
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question, however, 
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill 
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage 
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who 
support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser 
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so " .. '-~ AL.lJ. 
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is~ a passive inves- t~"~ r---y 
tor not engaged in the daily management- of the business. 
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doc-
trine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for 
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of 
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws; 37 
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District Court 
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even 
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of 
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 13a. 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale 
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in 
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This 
woul inevitably lead to difficult questions of line-drawing. 
e cts' coverage would in every case depend not only on 
the percentage of stock transferred, but also~such factors as @ 
the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting and 
veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we explain 
more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at --, decided 
today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts 
would in most cases be unknown and unknowab~o the par-
ties at the time the stock was sold. We eeiieve hese unce 
~.._..-~... 
tainties attending the applicability of the Acts would ~llii~~~~ee:~=~-
Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9 
(rejecting the argument that the certificate of deposit at issue 
' . 
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there was transformed, chameleon-like, into a "security" 
once it was pledged). Respondents argue that adopting peti-
tioner's approach will increase the workload of the federal 
courts by converting state and common law fraud claims into 
federal claims. We find more daunting, however, the pros-
pect that parties to a transaction may never know whether 
they are covered by the Acts until they engage in extended 
discovery and litigation over a concept as often elusive as the 
passage of control. Accord, Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 
1145-1146. 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "se-
curity" within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. . 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a compa.ny is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
After having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the 
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumber company. 
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as a consultant for some 
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant 
to the terms of the stock purchase agreement, Dennis as-
signed the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation 
. formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company 
~tock. . B & D then.merged with the lumber company, form-
ing petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then 
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of 
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class 
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that re-
spondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq. 
(the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security'' within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
knowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities 
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. Relying on 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), 
. the District Court ruled that the stock could not be consid-
e,red a ."security"'. unless the purchaser had entered into the 
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits . derived 
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control 
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers, 
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture 
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. -- (1984): We 
now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Dan-
iel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77b(1), defines a "security'' as including · 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share; investment contract, voting-trust 
4 
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, .gas, or other mineral rights, 
... or, in general, any'interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those charac-
teristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right 
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of 
1 We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security'' in § 3(a)(10) 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, '421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975). 
' . 
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or 
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in propor-
tion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to 
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851. 
Under the facts of Forman, ·we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
. ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock e~titling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the 
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. More-
over, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction in-
volved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of 
the kind of context to which the Acts normally apply. It is 
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor 
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of 
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as 
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in en-
2 Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here 
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock, 
the kind of stock often at issue in cases involving the sale of a business. 
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and 
still be covered by the Acts. 
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
and fair disclosure relative to tpe issuance of 'the many types 
of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security.'" SEC v. W. J. Howey Co. , 
. 328 U. S., at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess., 11 (1933)) . .. Although we recognize that Congress did 
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all 
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we 
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad definition 
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here 
falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner. 3 Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinions, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treat-
ing notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories 
differently. We address these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
8 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L. 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at 
11-12. 
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933 
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a 
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in-
. terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of 
t.he Act does not'.stop with the obvious and commonplace." 
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devices such 
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as 
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under 
terms or courses of dealing which established their character 
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid. 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the 
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could 
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the trans-
action so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of 
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract 
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the pro-
ceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering con-
stituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers." 328 U. S., at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were "investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their 
' . 
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of 
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
. their name and characteristics. · Instead, they argue that our 
c.ases require us ·in .every instance t~ look to the ec.onomic I 
substance of the transactiOn to determme whether the Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of 
others, but to buy a company that it could manage and con-
trol. Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Con-
gress intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepre-
neur, who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased 
just as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apart-
ments they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, 
respondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to. understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character-
ized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts 
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been 
• Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967), 
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings 
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a pri-
vately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit 
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of 
deposit, for a security." 
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions in-
dicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls 
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in 
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly 
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as 
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteris-
tics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac-
teristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5. 
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality 
test was designed to determine whether a particular instru-
ment is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within 
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "secu-
rity." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Teamsters 
5 In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security," 
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes 
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security'" (quoting 
Forman, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as 
respondents do. We made the statement in Forman in reference to the 
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and 
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] com-
monly known as a 'security'" within the statutory definition. We stated, 
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v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the 
Howey test to "determine whether a particular financial rela-
tionship constitutes an investment contract"); United Hous-
ing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see 
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to tradi-
tional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the 
· statutory definition . would make the Acts' enumeration of 
many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v., Gara-
falo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not pri-
vately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of con-
trol to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p. 
Eliminating from the definition of "security" instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord, 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Further-
more, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2), 
exempts transactions not involving any public offering from 
the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable ex-
as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment con-
tracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between 
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "secu-
rity .. "'" 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the 
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a 
security, but only that once the label "stock" did ·not hold true, we per-
ceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the in-
struments as ''investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly 
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a 
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emption from the antifraud provisions. Thus, the structure 
and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 6 
B 
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating 
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its 
· characteristics m~ans that other categories listed in the stat-
utory definition, such as notes, must be treated th~ same 
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage -of notes 
or other instruments may be provable by their name and 
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think 
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other 
categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be-
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at 
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock 
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining 
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi-
6 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does 
not involve a security." L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
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tional stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card slip is not selling a security even though 
his· signature is an 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
a security as to foreclose further analysis." I d., at 212 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiner's 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors, 468 U. S. -- (1984), "note" 
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encom-
passes instruments with widely varying characteristics, de-
pending on whether issued in a consumer context, as com-
mercial paper, or in some other investment context. See 
id., at --. We here expressly leave until another day the 
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category 
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by 
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" 
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of 
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
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case. 7 By respondents' own admission, application of the 
doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed 
to the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this 
7 JUSTICE STEVENS dissents on the ·ground that Congress did not intend 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to apply to "the 
private sale of a substantial ownership interest in [a business] simply be-
. cause the transaction[] w[as] structured as [a] sale[] of stock instead of as-
sets." P.ost, at 4. juSTICE STEVENS, of course, is correct in saying that 
it is clear from the legislative history of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 
1934 that Congress was concerned primarily with transactions "in securi-
ties ... traded in a public market." United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 849 (1975). It also is true that there is no indica-
tion in the legislative history that Congress considered the type of transac-
tions involved in this case and in Gould v. Ruefenacht, infra. 
The history is simply silent-as it is with respect to other transactions to 
which these Acts have been applied by the Commission and judicial inter-
pretation over the half century since this legislation was adopted. One 
only need mention the expansive interpretation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act 
and Rule 10b-5 adopted by the Commission. What the Court said in Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 (1975), is relevant: 
"When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a judi-
cial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such 
growth may be quite consistent with the congressional enactment and with 
the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it, see J. I. Case Co. v 
Borak, [377 U. S. 426 (1964)], but it would be disingenuous to suggest that 
either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5. 
It is therefore proper that we consider, in addition to the factors already 
discussed, what may be described as policy considerations when we come 
to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the con-
gressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive 
guidance." Id., at 737. 
See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 196-197 (1976). 
In this case, unlike with respect to the interpretation of§ 10(b) in Blue 
Chip Stamps, we have the plain language of § 2(1) of the 1933 Act in sup-
port of our interpretation. In Forman, supra, we recognized that the 
term "stock" is to be read in accordance with the common understanding of 
its meaning, including the characteristics identified in Forman. See 
supra, at 4-5. In addition, as stated in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, it is 
proper for a court to consider-as we do today-policy considerations in 
construing terms in these Acts. 
. . 
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case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% 
of'a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question, however, 
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill 
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage 
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who 
. support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser 
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so 
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is simply a passive in-
vestor not engaged in the daily management of the business. 
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doc-
trine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for 
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of 
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws; 37 
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District Court 
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even 
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of 
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 13a. 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale 
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in 
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This 
inevitably would lead to difficult questions of line-drawing. I 
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on 
the percentage of stock transferred, but also on such factors f 
as the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting 
and veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we ex-
plain more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at --, de-
cided today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts 
would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to th~ par-
ties at the time the stock was sold. These uncertainties at- ~ 
tending the applicability of the Acts would hardly be in the 
best interests of either party to a transaction. Cf. Marine 
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9 (rejecting the argu-
ment that the certificate of deposit at issue there was trans-
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formed, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it was 
pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's ap-
proach will increase the workload of the federal courts by 
converting state and common law fraud claims into federal 
claims. We find more daunting, however, the prospect that 
parties to a transaction may never know whether they are 
covered by the Acts until they engage in extended discovery 
. and litigation over-a concept as often elusive as the passage ·of 
controL Accord, · G"olden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1145.-1146. 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "secu-
rity'' within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether the sale of all of 
the stock of a company is a securities transaction subject to 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws (the 
Acts). 
I 
Respondents I van K. Landreth and his sons owned all of 
the outstanding stock of a lumber business they operated in 
Tonasket, Washington. The Landreth family offered their 
stock for sale through both Washington and out-of-state bro-
kers. Before a purchaser was found, the company's sawmill 
was heavily damaged by fire. Despite the fire, the brokers 
continued to offer the stock for sale. Potential purchasers 
were advised of the damage, but were told that the mill 
would be completely rebuilt and modernized. 
Samuel Dennis, a Massachusetts tax attorney, received a 
letter offering the stock for sale. On the basis of the letter's 
representations concerning the rebuilding plans, the pre-
dicted productivity of the mill, existing contracts, and 
expected profits, Dennis became interested in acquiring the 
stock. He talked to John Bolten, a former client who had re-
tired to Florida, about joining him in investigating the offer. 
Mter having an audit and an inspection of the mill conducted, 
a stock purchase agreement was negotiated, with Dennis the 
purchaser of all of the common stock in the lumber company. . 
' . 
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I van Landreth agreed to stay on as . a consultant for some 
time to help with the daily operations of the mill. Pursuant 
to the terms of the stock ·purchase agreement, Dennis as-
signed the stock he purchased to B & D Co., a corporation 
. formed for the sole purpose of acquiring the lumber company 
~tock. . B & D then .'merged with the lumber company, form-
ing petitioner Landreth Timber Co. Dennis and Bolten then 
acquired all of petitioner's Class A stock, representing 85% of 
the equity, and six other investors together owned the Class 
B stock, representing the remaining 15% of the equity. 
After the acquisition was completed, the mill did not live 
up to the purchasers' expectations. Rebuilding costs ex-
ceeded earlier estimates, and new components turned out to 
be incompatible with existing equipment. Eventually, peti-
tioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed this suit seeking rescission of the sale of 
stock and $2,500,000 in damages, alleging that respondents 
had widely offered and then sold their stock without register-
ing it as required by the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77a et seq., (the 1933 Act). Petitioner also alleged that re-
spondents had negligently or intentionally made misrep-
resentations and had failed to state material facts as to the 
worth and prospects of the lumber company, all in violation of 
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U. S. C. § 78a et seq. 
(the 1934 Act). 
Respondents moved for summary judgment on the ground 
that the transaction was not covered by the Acts because 
under the so-called "sale of business" doctrine, petitioner had 
not purchased a "security" within the meaning of those Acts. 
The District Court granted respondents' motion and dis-
missed the complaint for want of federal jurisdiction. It ac-
knowledged that the federal statutes include "stock" as one of 
the instruments constituting a "security," and that the stock 
at issue possessed all of the characteristics of conventional 
stock. Nonetheless, it joined what it termed the "growing 
majority" of courts that had held that the federal securities 
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laws do not apply to the sale of 100% of the stock of a closely 
held corporation. App. to Pet. for Cer.t. 13a. Relying on 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 328 U. S. 293 (1946), 
. the District Court ruled that the stock could not be consid-
~red a ."security"·. unless the purchaser had entered into the 
transaction with the anticipation of earning profits derived 
from the efforts of others. Finding that managerial control 
of the business had passed into the hands of the purchasers, 
and thus, that the transaction was a commercial venture 
rather than a typical investment, the District Court dis-
missed the complaint. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the District Court's application of the sale of busi-
ness doctrine. 731 F. 2d 1348 (1984). It agreed that it was 
bound by United Housing Foundation v. Forman, supra, 
and SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, to determine in every 
case whether the economic realities of the transaction indi-
cated that the Acts applied. Because the Courts ·of Appeals 
are divided over the applicability of the federal securities 
laws when a business is sold by the transfer of 100% of its 
stock, we granted certiorari. 469 U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
II 
It is axiomatic that "[t]he starting point in every case 
involving construction of a statute is the language itself." 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723, 756 
(1975) (POWELL, J., concurring); accord, Teamsters v. Dan-
iel, 439 U. S. 551, 558 (1979). Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act, 
48 Stat. 74, as amended and as set forth in 15 U. S. C. 
§ 77b(1), defines a "security'' as including 
"any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evi-
dence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or partici-
pation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust 
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, vo~ing-trust 
4 
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certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, 
. . . or, in general, any· interest or instrument commonly 
known as a 'security,' or any certificate of interest or 
participation in, temporary· or interim certificate for, re-
ceipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to subscribe 
to or purchase, any of the foregoing." 1 
As we have observed in the past, this definition is quite 
broad, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), 
and includes both instruments whose names alone carry well-
settled meaning, as well as instruments of "more variable 
character [that] were necessarily designated by more de-
scriptive terms," such as "investment contract" and "instru-
ment commonly known as a 'security."' SEC v. C. M. 
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344, 351 (1943). The face of 
the definition shows that "stock" is considered to be a "secu-
rity'' within the meaning of the Acts. As we observed in 
United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837 
(1975), most instruments bearing such a traditional title are 
likely to be covered by the definition. I d., at 850. 
As we also recognized in Forman, the fact that instru-
ments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to in-
voke the coverage of the Acts. Rather, we concluded that 
we must also determine whether those instruments possess 
"some of the significant characteristics typically associated 
with" stock, id., at 851, recognizing that when an instrument 
is both called "stock" and bears stock's usual characteristics, 
"a purchaser justifiably [may] assume that the federal securi-
ties laws apply," id., at 850. We identified those charac-
teristics usually associated with common stock as (i) the right 
to receive dividends contingent upon an apportionment of 
1 We have repeatedly ruled that the definitions of "security" in§ 3(a)(10) 
of the 1934 Act and § 2(1) of the 1933 Act are virtually identical and will 
be treated as such in our decisions dealing with the scope of the term. 
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 555, n. 3 (1982); United Housing 
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 847, n. 12 (1975). 
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profits; (ii) negotiability; (iii) the ability to be pledged or 
hypothecated; (iv) the conferring of voting rights in propor-
tion to the number of shares owned; and (v) the capacity to 
appreciate in value. 2 I d., at 851. 
Under the facts of Forman, 'we concluded that the instru-
ments at issue there were not "securities" within the mean-
ing of the Acts. That case involved the sale of shares of 
stock entitling the purchaser to lease an apartment in a hous-
ing cooperative. The stock bore none of the characteristics 
listed above that are usually associated with traditional 
stock. Moreover, we concluded that under the circum-
stances, there was no likelihood that the purchasers had been 
misled by use of the word "stock" into thinking that the fed-
eral securities laws governed their purchases. The purchas-
ers had intended to acquire low-cost subsidized living space 
for their personal use; no one was likely to have believed that 
he was purchasing investment securities. Ibid. 
In contrast, it is undisputed that the stock involved here 
possesses all of the characteristics we identified in Forman 
as traditionally associated with common stock. Indeed, the 
District Court so found. App. to Pet. for Cert. 13a. More-
over, unlike in Forman, the context of the transaction in-
volved here-the sale of stock in a corporation-is typical of 
the kind of context to which the Acts normally apply. It is 
thus much more likely here than in Forman that an investor 
would believe he was covered by the federal securities laws. 
Under the circumstances of this case, the plain meaning of 
the statutory definition mandates that the stock be treated as 
"securities" subject to the coverage of the Acts. 
Reading the securities laws to apply to the sale of stock at 
issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose in en-
2 Although we did not so specify in Forman, we wish to make clear here 
that these characteristics are those usually associated with common stock, 
the kind of stock often at issue in cases involving the sale of a business. I 
Various types of preferred stock may have different characteristics and 
still be covered by the Acts. 
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acting the legislation to protect investors by "compelling full 
and fair disclosure relative to tpe issuance of 'the many types 
of instruments that in our 'commercial world fall within the 
ordinary concept of a security.'" SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., 
-328 U. $.,at 299 (quoting H. R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st 
Sess., 11 (1933)). · _ Although we recognize that Congress did 
not intend to provide a comprehensive federal remedy for all 
fraud, Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551, 556 (1982), we 
think it would improperly narrow Congress' broad definition 
of "security" to hold that the traditional stock at issue here 
falls outside the Acts' coverage. 
III 
Under other circumstances, we might consider the statu-
tory analysis outlined above to be a sufficient answer compel-
ling judgment for petitioner.3 Respondents urge, however, 
that language in our previous opinion~, including Forman, 
requires that we look beyond the label "stock" and .the 
characteristics of the instruments involved to determine 
whether application of the Acts is mandated by the economic 
substance of the transaction. Moreover, the Court of Ap-
peals rejected the view that the plain meaning of the defini-
tion would be sufficient to hold this stock covered, because it 
saw "no principled way," 731 F. 2d, at 1353, to justify treat-
ing notes, bonds, and other of the definitional categories 
differently. We address these concerns in turn. 
A 
It is fair to say that our cases have not been entirely clear 
on the proper method of analysis for determining when an in-
strument is a "security." This Court has decided a number 
of cases in which it looked to the economic substance of the 
transaction, rather than just to its form, to determine 
3 Professor Loss suggests that the statutory analysis is sufficient. L. 
Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 212 (1983). See infra, at 
11-12. 
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whether the Acts applied. In SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing 
Corp., for example, the Court considered whether the 1933 
Act applied to the sale of leasehold interests in land near a 
proposed oil well drilling. In holding that the leasehold in-
. terests were "securities," the Court noted that "the reach of 
t.he Act does nof .stop with the obvious and commonplace." 
320 U. S., at 351. Rather, it ruled that unusual devic'es such 
as the leaseholds would also be covered "if it be proved as 
matter of fact that they were widely offered or dealt in under · 
terms or courses of dealing which established their character 
in commerce as 'investment contracts,' or as 'any interest or 
instrument commonly known as a 'security."' Ibid. 
SEC v. W. J. Howey Co., supra, further elucidated the 
Joiner Court's suggestion that an unusual instrument could 
be considered a "security" if the circumstances of the trans-
action so dictated. At issue in that case was an offering of 
units of a citrus grove development coupled with a contract 
for cultivating and marketing the fruit and remitting the pro-
ceeds to the investors. The Court held that the offering con-
stituted an "investment contract" within the meaning of the 
1933 Act because, looking at the economic realities, the 
transaction "involve[ d) an investment of money in a common 
enterprise with profits to come solely from the efforts of oth-
ers." 328 U. S., at 301. 
This so-called "Howey test" formed the basis for the second 
part of our decision in Forman, on which respondents pri-
marily rely. As discussed above, see Part II, supra, the 
first part of our decision in Forman concluded that the 
instruments at issue, while they bore the traditional label 
"stock," were not "securities" because they possessed none 
of the usual characteristics of stock. We then went on to ad-
dress the argument that the instruments were "investment 
contracts." Applying the Howey test, we concluded that the 
instruments likewise were not "securities" by virtue of being 
"investment contracts" because the economic realities of the 
transaction showed that the purchasers had parted with their 
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money not for the purpose of reaping profits from the efforts 
of others, but for the purpose of purchasing a commodity for 
personal consumption. 421 U. S., at 858. 
Respondents contend that Forman and the cases on which 
it was based 4 require us to reject the view that the shares of 
stock at issue here may be considered "securities" because of 
. their name and characteristics. Instead, they argue that our 
c.ases require us ·in . every instance to look to the economic J 
substance of the transaction to determine whether the 'Howey 
test has been met. According to respondents, it is clear that 
petitioner sought not to earn profits from the efforts of 
others, but to buy a company that it could manage and con-
trol. Petitioner was not a passive investor of the kind Con-
gress intended the Acts to protect, but an active entrepre-
neur, who sought to "use or consume" the business purchased 
just as the purchasers in Forman sought to use the apart-
ments they acquired after purchasing shares of stock. Thus, 
respondents urge that the Acts do not apply. 
We disagree with respondents' interpretation of our cases. 
First, it is important to understand the contexts within which 
these cases were decided. All of the cases on which respond-
ents rely involved unusual instruments not easily character-
ized as "securities." See n. 3, supra. Thus, if the Acts 
were to apply in those cases at all, it would have to have been 
• Respondents also rely on Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U. S. 332 (1967), 
and Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S. 551 (1982), as support for their ar-
gument that we have mandated in every case a determination of whether 
the economic realities of a transaction call for the application of the Acts. 
It is sufficient to note here that these cases, like the other cases on which 
respondents rely, involved unusual instruments that did not fit squarely 
within one of the enumerated specific kinds of securities listed in the defini-
tion. Tcherepnin involved withdrawable capital shares in a state savings 
and loan association, and Weaver involved a certificate of deposit and a pri-
vately negotiated profit sharing agreement. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 
supra, at 557, n. 5, for an explanation of why the certificate of deposit 
involved there did not fit within the definition's category "certificate of 
deposit, for a security." 
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because the economic reality underlying the transactions in-
dicated that the instruments were actually of a type that falls 
within the usual concept of a security. In the case at bar, in 
contrast, the instrument involved is traditional stock, plainly 
within the statutory definition. There is no need here, as 
there was in the prior cases, to look beyond the characteris-
tics of the instrument to determine whether the Acts apply. 
Contrary to respondents' implication, the Court has never 
foreclosed the possibility that stock could be found to be a 
"security" simply because it is what it purports to be. In 
SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U. S. 344 (1943), 
the Court noted that "we do nothing to the words of the Act; 
we merely accept them. . . . In some cases, [proving that 
the documents were securities] might be done by proving the 
document itself, which on its face would be a note, a bond, or 
a share of stock." !d., at 355. Nor does Forman require a 
different result. Respondents are correct that in Forman 
we eschewed a "literal" approach that would invoke the Acts' 
coverage simply because the instrument carried the label 
"stock." Forman does not, however, eliminate the Court's 
ability to hold that an instrument is covered when its charac-
teristics bear out the label. See supra, at 4-5. 
Second, we would note that the Howey economic reality 
test was designed to determine whether a particular instru-
ment is an "investment contract," not whether it fits within 
any of the examples listed in the statutory definition of "secu-
rity." Our cases are consistent with this view. 5 Teamsters 
5 In support of their contention that the Court has mandated use of the 
Howey test whenever it determines whether an instrument is a "security," 
respondents quote our statement in Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U. S. 551, 
558, n. 11 (1979) that the Howey test "'embodies the essential attributes 
that run through all of the Court's decisions defining a security'" (quoting 
F01'1rULn, 421 U. S., at 852). We do not read this bit of dicta as broadly as 
respondents do. We made the statement in F01'1rULn in reference to the 
purchasers' argument that if the instruments at issue were not "stock" and 
were not "investment contracts," at least they were "instrument[s] com-
monly known as a 'security' " within the statutory definition. We stated, 
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v. Daniel, 439 U. S., at 558 (appropriate to turn to the 
Howey test to "determine whether a particular financial rela-
tionship constitutes an investment contract"); United Hous-
ing Foundation, Inc. v. Fo_'f"m!1n, 421 U. S. 837 (1975); see 
supra, at 7. Moreover, applying the Howey test to tradi-
tional stock and all other types of instruments listed in the 
· statutory definition . would make the Acts' enumeration of 
many types of instruments superfluous. Golden v., Gara-
falo, 678 F. 2d 1139, 1144 (CA2 1982). See Tcherepnin v. 
Knight, 389 U. S. 332, 343 (1967). 
Finally, we cannot agree with respondents that the Acts 
were intended to cover only "passive investors" and not pri-
vately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of con-
trol to "entrepreneurs." The 1934 Act contains several 
provisions specifically governing tender offers, disclosure of 
transactions by corporate officers and principal stockholders, 
and the recovery of short-swing profits gained by such per-
sons. See, e. g., 1934 Act, §§ 14, 16, 15 U. S. C. §§ 78n, 78p. 
Eliminating from the definition of "security'' instruments in-
volved in transactions where control passed to the purchaser 
would contravene the purposes of these provisions. Accord, 
Daily v. Morgan, 701 F. 2d 496, 503 (CA5 1983). Further-
more, although § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 U. S. C. § 77d(2), 
exempts transactions not involving any public offering from 
the Act's registration provisions, there is no comparable ex-
as part of our analysis of whether the instruments were "investment con-
tracts," that we perceived "no distinction, for present purposes, between 
an 'investment contract' and an 'instrument commonly known as a "secu-
rity.""' 421 U. S., at 852 (emphasis added). This was not to say that the 
Howey test applied to any case in which an instrument was alleged to be a 
security, but only that once the label "stock" did not hold true, we per-
ceived no reason to analyze the case differently whether we viewed the in-
struments as "investment contracts" or as falling within another similarly 
general category of the definition-an "instrument commonly known as a 
'security.'" Under either of these general categories, the Howey test 
would apply. 
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emption from the antifraud provisions. Thus, the structure 
and language of the Acts refute respondents' position. 6 
B 
We now turn to the Court of Appeals' concern that treating 
stock as a specific category of "security" provable by its 
characteristics m~ans that other categories listed in the stat-
utory definition, such as notes, must be treated th~ same 
way. Although we do not decide whether coverage -of notes 
or other instruments may be provable by their name and 
characteristics, we do point out several reasons why we think 
stock may be distinguishable from most if not all of the other 
categories listed in the Acts' definition. 
Instruments that bear both the name and all of the usual 
characteristics of stock seem to us to be the clearest case for 
coverage by the plain language of the definition. First, tra-
ditional stock "represents to many people, both trained and 
untrained in business matters, the paradigm of a security." 
Daily v. Morgan, supra, at 500. Thus persons trading in 
traditional stock likely have a high expectation that their 
activities are governed by the Acts. Second, as we made 
clear in Forman, "stock" is relatively easy to identify be-
cause it lends itself to consistent definition. See supra, at 
4-5. Unlike some instruments, therefore, traditional stock 
is more susceptible of a plain meaning approach. 
Professor Loss has agreed that stock is different from the 
other categories of instruments. He observes that it "goes 
against the grain" to apply the Howey test for determining 
whether an instrument is an "investment contract" to tradi-
6 In criticizing the sale of business doctrine, Professor Loss agrees. He 
considers that the doctrine "comes dangerously close to the heresy of say-
ing that the fraud provisions do not apply to private transactions; for no-
body, apparently, has had the temerity to argue that the sale of a publicly 
owned business for stock of the acquiring corporation that is distributed to 
the shareholders of the selling corporation as a liquidating dividend does 
not involve a security." · L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regulation 
212 (1983) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
83-1961-0PINION 
12 LANDRETH TIMBER CO. v. LANDRETH 
tiona! stock. L. Loss, Fundamentals of Securities Regula-
tion 211-212 (1983). As Professor Loss explains, 
"It is one thing to say that the typical cooperative apart-
ment dweller has bought a home, not a security; or that 
not every installment purchase 'note' is a security; or 
that a person who charges a restaurant meal by signing 
his credit card_ slip is not selling a security even though 
his· signature is ~m 'evidence of indebtedness.' But stock 
(except for the residential wrinkle) is so quintessentially 
a security as to foreclose further analysis." Id., at 212 
(emphasis in original). 
We recognize that in SEC v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 
320 U. S. 344 (1943), the Court equated "notes" and "bonds" 
with "stock" as categories listed in the statutory definition 
that were standardized enough to rest on their names. I d., 
at 355. Nonetheless, in Forman, we characterized Joiners 
language as dictum. 421 U. S., at 850. As we recently sug-
gested in a different context in Securities Industry Asso-
ciation v. Board of Governors, 468 U. S. -- (1984), "note" 
may now be viewed as a relatively broad term that encom-
passes instruments with widely varying characteristics, de-
pending on whether issued in a consumer context, as com-
mercial paper, or in some other investment context. See 
id., at --. We here expressly leave until another day the 
question whether "notes" or "bonds" or some other category 
of instrument listed in the definition might be shown "by 
proving [only] the document itself." SEC v. C. M. Joiner 
Leasing Corp., supra, at 355. We hold only that "stock" 
may be viewed as being in a category by itself for purposes of 
interpreting the scope of the Acts' definition of "security." 
IV 
We also perceive strong policy reasons for not employing 
the sale of business doctrine under the circumstances of this 
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case. 7 By respondents' own admission, application of the 
doctrine depends in each case on whether control has passed 
to the purchaser. It may be argued that on the facts of this 
7 JUSTICE STEVENS dissents on the ground that Congress did not intend 
the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws to apply to "the 
private sale of a substantial ownership interest in [a business] simply be-
cause the transaction[] w[as] structured as [a] sale[] of stock instead of as-
s.ets." Post, at 4. jusTICE STEVENS, of course, is correct in saying that 
it is clear from the legislative history of the Securities Acts of 1933 and 
1934 that Congress was concerned primarily with transactions "in securi-
ties ... traded in a public market." United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. 
Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 849 (1975). It also is true that there is no indica-
tion in the legislative history that Congress considered the type of transac-
tions involved in this case and in Gould v. Ruefenacht, infra. 
The history is simply silent-as it is with respect to other transactions to 
which these Acts have been applied by the Commission and judicial inter-
pretation over the half century since this legislation was adopted. One 
only need mention the expansive interpretation of § 10(b) of the 1934 Act 
and Rule 10b-5 adopted by the Commission. What the Court said in Blue 
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U. S. 723 (1975), is relevant: 
"When we deal with private actions under Rule lOb-5, we deal with a judi-
cial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn. Such 
growth may be quite consistent with the congressional enactment and with 
the role of the federal judiciary in interpreting it, see J. I. Case Co. v 
Borak, [377 U. S. 426 (1964)], but it would be disingenuous to suggest that 
either Congress in 1934 or the Securities and Exchange Commission in 
1942 foreordained the present state of the law with respect to Rule 10b-5. 
It is therefore proper that we consider, in addition to the factors already 
discussed, what may be described as policy considerations when we come 
to flesh out the portions of the law with respect to which neither the con-
gressional enactment nor the administrative regulations offer conclusive 
guidance." !d., at 737. 
See also Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U. S. 185, 196-197 (1976). 
In this case, unlike with respect to the interpretation of§ 10(b) in Blue 
Chip Stamps, we have the plain language of§ 2(1) of the 1933 Act in sup-
port of our interpretation. In Forman, supra, we recognized that the 
term "stock" is to be read in accordance with the common understanding of 
its meaning, including the characteristics identified in Forman. See 
supra, at 4-5. In addition, as stated in Blue Chip Stamps, supra, it is 
proper for a court to consider-as we do today-policy considerations in 
construing terms in these Acts. 
.. 
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case, the doctrine is easily applied, since the transfer of 100% 
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control. We 
think even that assertion is open to some question, however, 
as Dennis and Bolten had no intention of running the sawmill 
themselves. I van Landreth apparently stayed on to manage 
the daily affairs of the business. Some commentators who 
. support the sale of business doctrine believe that a purchaser 
who has the ability to exert control but chooses not to do so 
may deserve the Acts' protection if he is simply a passive in- \ 
vestor not engaged in the daily management of the business. 
Easley, Recent Developments in the Sale-of-Business Doc-
trine: Toward a Transactional Context-Based Analysis for 
Federal Securities Jurisdiction, 39 Bus. Law. 929, 971-972 
(1984); Seldin, When Stock is Not a Security: The "Sale of 
Business" Doctrine Under the Federal Securities Laws; 37 
Bus. Law. 637, 679 (1982). In this case, the District Court 
was required to undertake extensive fact-finding, and even 
requested supplemental facts and memoranda on the issue of 
control, before it was able to decide the case. App. to Pet. 
for Cert. 13a. 
More importantly, however, if applied to this case, the sale 
of business doctrine would also have to be applied to cases in 
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold. This 
inevitably would lead to difficult questions of line-drawing. 
The Acts' coverage would in every case depend not only on 
the percentage of stock transferred, but also on such factors 
as the number of purchasers and what provisions for voting 
and veto rights were agreed upon by the parties. As we ex-
plain more fully in Gould v. Ruefenacht, post, at --, de-
cided today as a companion to this case, coverage by the Acts 
f would in most cases be unknown and unknowable to the par-
. ties at the time the stock was sold. These uncertainties at- ~ 
tending the applicability of the Acts would hardly be in the 
best interests of either party to a transaction. Cf. Marine 
Bank v. Weaver, 455 U. S., at 559, n. 9 (rejecting the argu-
ment that the certificate of deposit at issue there was trans-
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fonned, chameleon-like, into a "security" once it was 
pledged). Respondents argue that adopting petitioner's ap-
proach will increase the workload of the federal courts by 
converting state and common law fraud claims into federal 
claims. We find more daunting, however, the prospect that 
parties to a transaction may never know whether they are 
covered by the Acts until they engage in extended discovery 
·.and litigation over-a concept as often elusive as the passage of 
controL Accord, Oolden v. Garafalo, 678 F. 2d 1145-1146. 
v 
In sum, we conclude that the stock at issue here is a "secu-
rity" within the definition of the Acts, and that the 
sale of business doctrine does not apply. The judgment of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is 
. therefore 
Reversed. 
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Respondents father and sons, who owned all of the common stock of a 
lumber business that they operated, offered their stock for sale through 
brokers. The company's sawmjll was subsequently damaged by fire, 
but potential purchasers were told that the mill would be rebuilt and 
modernized. Thereafter, a stock purchase agreement for all of the stock 
was executed, and ultimately petitioner company was formed by the pur-
chasers. Respondent father agreed to stay on as a consultant for some 
time to help with the daily opera'tion of the mill. After the acquisition 
was completed, the mill did not live up to the purchasers' expectations. 
Eventually, petitioner sold the mill at a loss and went into receivership. 
Petitioner then filed suit in Federal District Court for rescission of the 
sale of stock and damages, alleging that respondents had violated the 
registration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) and the 
antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The court 
granted summary judgment for respondents, holding that under the 
"sale of business" doctrine, the stock could not be considered a "security'' 
for purposes of the Acts because managerial control of the business had 
passed into the hands of the purchasers, who bought 100% of the stock. 
The court concluded that the transaction thus was a commercial venture 
rather than a typical investment. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 
Held: The stock at issue here is a "security'' within the definition of 
the Acts, United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U. S. 837, 
distinguished, and the "sale of business" doctrine does not apply. 
Pp. 3-14. 
(a) Section 2(1) of the 1933 Act defines a "security" as including 
"stock" and other listed types of instruments. Although the fact that 
instruments bear the label "stock" is not of itself sufficient to invoke the 
Acts' coverage, when an instrument is both called "stock" and bears 
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stock's usual characteristics as identified in Forman, supra, a purchaser 
justifiably may assume that the federal securities laws apply. The stock 
involved here possesses all of the characteristics traditionally associated 
with common stock. Moreover, reading the securities laws to apply to 
the sale of stock at issue here comports with Congress' remedial purpose 
in enacting the legislation to protect investors. Pp. 3-6. 
(b) When an instrument is labeled "stock" and possesses all of the tra-
ditional characteristics of stock, a court is not required to look to the 
economic substance of the transaction to determine whether the stock is 
a "security" within the meaning of the Acts. A contrary rule is not sup-
ported by this Court's prior decisions involving unusual instruments not 
easily characterized as "securities." Nor were the Acts intended, as 
asserted by respondents, to cover only "passive investors" and not pri-
vately negotiated transactions involving the transfer of control to "entre-
preneurs." Pp. 6-11. 
(c) An instrument bearing both the name and all of the usual charac-
teristics of stock presents the clearest case for coverage by the plain 
language of the definition. "Stock" is distinguishable from most if not 
all of the other listed categories, and may be viewed as being in a cate-
gory by itself for purposes of interpreting the Acts' definition of "secu-
rity." Pp. 11-12. 
(d) Application of the "sale of business" doctrine depends on whether 
control has passed to the purchaser. Even though the transfer of 100% 
of a corporation's stock normally transfers control, the purchasers here 
had no intention of running the sawmill themselves. Moreover, if the 
doctrine were applied here, it would also have to be applied to cases in 
which less than 100% of a company's stock was sold, thus inevitably lead-
ing to difficult questions of line-drawing. As explained in Gould v. 
Ruefenacht, post, p. --, coverage by the Acts would in most -cases be 
unknown and unknowable to the parties at the time the stock was sold. 
Such uncertainties attending the applicability of the Acts would be intol-
erable. Pp. 12-14. 
731 F. 2d 1348, reversed, 
POWELL, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., 
and BRENNAN, WHITE, MARSHALL, BLACKMUN, REHNQUIST, and O'CON-
NOR, JJ., joined. STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
